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Abstract 
Essays on Ideal Norms and Non-Ideal Agents 
Amelia Kahn, Ph.D. 
The University of Texas at Austin, 2021 
Supervisor:  Sinan Dogramaci 
My dissertation focuses on idealized epistemology and challenges that arise when 
we apply it to actual human agents. With the rise of formal epistemology, worries about 
the role that idealization plays in normative epistemology and the relevance of highly 
idealized norms to us non-ideal agents have become more pressing. I focus on two types 
of challenges to idealized norms. The first, which is the subject of the first two chapters, 
concerns constraints that our limited cognitive resources and time place on our epistemic 
lives. The second is a metaphysical challenge to theorizing about credences, on the basis 
that they poorly represent our actual graded belief states.  
The first chapter focuses on clutter avoidance worries. Gilbert Harman argues that 
a strong logical closure norm which would require us to believe all the consequences of 
our beliefs must be rejected because following such a norm would “clutter up our minds 
with trivialities.” Call this the Clutter Argument. The Clutter Argument has attracted 
broad sympathy in the literature, yet there has been surprisingly little attention paid to 
how the Clutter Argument is meant to work. In this paper I argue that the Clutter 
Argument fails. First, I argue for a novel account of clutter, the waste view, which 
identifies clutter with beliefs that waste cognitive resources. I motivate the acceptance of 
this new account in part by presenting several counterexamples to Jane Friedman’s 
v
(2018) account, which identifies clutter with beliefs about subject matters in which the 
agent has no interest. I argue that the only plausible clutter principle is one that rules out 
dynamic norms that would require we believe too much clutter. Finally, I show that even 
with such a clutter principle, the Clutter Argument fails because actual human agents 
typically believe consequences of their beliefs implicitly which does require them to 
clutter their minds.  
My second chapter takes as a starting point the recent claim from Jane Friedman 
that the norms of inquiry conflict with many norms of contemporary epistemology. In 
response to this conflict, we face a number of options. We can resign ourselves to the 
incoherence in the epistemic domain. We can radically revise the epistemic to eliminate 
the conflict. Finally, we can cleave the norms of inquiry from the epistemic, most 
naturally by insisting that they are, at bottom, practical. Call this final approach the 
separationist view. I offer a puzzle for the separationist gambit and canvas the possible 
responses to it. I argue that the best response is to reject a key premise: the claim that 
when you ought to come to believe P, and you cannot come to believe P and Q at the 
same time, then you are not permitted to come to believe that Q. However, I show that 
any satisfactory response the puzzle dissolves the original tension between the epistemic 
and the norms of inquiry, leaving us with no need to pursue the separationist strategy. 
The final chapter tackles the issue of whether comparativism about credences 
squares with probabilism. I offer a dilemma for comparativism about credences, the view 
that comparative beliefs, not real-valued credences, are psychologically real and 
primitive. If we require comparative beliefs to be probabilistically representable in a very 
strict way, then we should think that many rational agents' comparative beliefs are not 
representable by a probability function. On the other hand, if we require only a weaker 
form of probabilistic representability, then credences will fail to represent agents 
sufficiently well to epistemically evaluate agents.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Epistemology issues demands beyond what we limited human agents can hope to 
accomplish.  Formal epistemology, which models rational belief and knowledge with logic and 
probability, is perhaps most associated with norms that idealize away from human agents.  
However, norms that only idealized agents can meet are found in every corner of epistemology.  
Traditional epistemology gives us evidential norms which normal agents will inevitably fall short 
of meeting.  Recent trends in epistemology offer us still more ideal norms.  Knowledge-first 
epistemology commands us to believe P only if we know it.  Given our imperfect access to what 
we know, we're bound to miss the mark.  Even attempts to narrow the focus to humans and our 
projects have yielded norms beyond human reach.  For instance, Jane Friedman's clutter 
avoidance norm requires that we avoid believing propositions in which we have no interest.  This, 
of course, is wholly impossible for normal agents.  Ideal norms abound in epistemology.  So too 
do concerns about what ideal norms mean for human agents. 
The central theme of these essays is whether, and how, ideal norms can apply to non-
ideal agents.  I do not aspire to give a unified approach idealization in epistemology.  Rather, my 
aim is to think through a number of challenges to particular idealized norms–logical closure 
norms, evidential and knowledge norms, and the norms of probabilism– and address each on its 
merits.  Answering each of these challenges, it turns out, leads to broader questions about how we 
delineate the epistemic domain, how norms on forming beliefs relate to norms about the beliefs 
we should have at a given time, among others.   
In the first essay, I examine Gilbert Harman's Clutter Argument against a logical closure 
norm that requires that we believe all of the logical consequences of what we believe.  Such a 
norm, he says, could not apply to normal human agents, because if we were to do as it bids (or try 
to, for that matter), we would clutter our minds with useless, boring, trivialities.   While this 
looks, at first, like a familiar ought-implies-can concern, there is another, more compelling way to 
understand clutter avoidance.  The idea, roughly, is that the mandate to avoid cluttering our minds 
falls out of the type of agents we are: ones with limited cognitive resources.  Logical closure, on 
the other hand, is a norm only highly idealized agent can meet.  Surely, the thought goes, if one of 
these has to go, it's the extremely demanding ideal norm. 
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  I attempt to give an account of what this cognitive clutter is and why it is worth avoiding 
that accords with our intuitive judgments and with the relevant psychological findings.  Using this 
account, which I call the waste view, I reconstruct what I think is the best version of the Clutter 
Argument.  In the process, some interesting features of the argument come into view.  For one, it 
relies on a surprisingly strong principle about how norms on belief revision relate to norms on 
belief at a time.  What's more, the argument's success depends on our answer to an empirical 
question: what (typically) is the actual cost in terms of cognitive resources when normal human 
agents form boring, useless, clutter-y beliefs? 
 In the second essay, I look into a tension that Jane Friedman points to between the norms 
that govern inquiry and more traditional epistemic norms.  In some cases, she argues, we cannot 
follow these familiar epistemic norms and inquire as we ought to.  Inquiry occupies a somewhat 
odd place within epistemology.  On the one hand, it seems clear that inquiring is central to our 
epistemic lives.  On the other, carrying out inquiry happens in the world and therefore is subject 
to practical constraints that are typically ignored when we ask how agents ought to believe.   
While Friedman argues that this motivates a radical revision of our familiar epistemic norms, 
many others see the tension as reason to relegate norms of inquiry to the practical domain.   
 However, I argue that the each of the epistemic norms that produces tension with the 
norms of inquiry produces the very same sort of tension with itself.  To put it glibly, the tension 
was coming from inside the epistemic all along.  I offer a way to dissolve this tension that also 
dissolves the initial tension between the epistemic and the norms of inquiry.  The upshot is that 
we do not need to radically revise the epistemic to accommodate inquiry, nor do we need to 
banish inquiry to the practical domain.   Undoubtedly, many theorists still will.  But if they do, 
they do so based on their conception of what the epistemic is like, not because norms of inquiry 
and other epistemic norms put agents in a bind. 
 The final essay deals with different sort of concern about idealized norms: the attitudes 
that they govern.   Probabilism is a widely discussed and hugely productive view about rational 
credence.  Yet, as many a hushed conversation in the hallway of philosophy departments would 
attest, some philosophers are somewhat resistant to credence talk.  One way that you might 
respond to worries that precise real-valued credences are psychologically unrealistic is to 
underwrite them with something less fine-grained, more easily introspectable: comparative belief.   
This is, in broad outline, comparativism: the view that comparative belief, not credence, is 
psychologically real and primitive.  Now, the credence skeptic is expressing doubt about whether 
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she, a human agent, has credences.  Neither I nor the standard-bearers of comparativism directly 
take up the question of whether irrational comparative beliefs could underwrite (perhaps 
improbabilistic) credences.  However, I ask a related question in the third chapter.  I argue that 
comparativism cannot, in the end, vindicate probabilism.  The reason is that probabilities are not a 
particularly good representation of even a rational agent's comparative beliefs.  If a rational 
agent's comparative beliefs are not well represented by probability functions, then it seems 
comparativism has little to offer the credence skeptic. 
  It is probably clear by now that these essays have little in common as far as their content 
goes.  The thread they share is the abiding interest that led me to each of them: How can ideal 





CHAPTER 1: CLUTTER, JUNK, AND WASTE 
 
 
 A common but controversial proposal for how logic might constrain rational 
belief is that our beliefs ought to be closed under logical consequence. That is, we ought 
to believe all of the logical consequences of our beliefs. Gilbert Harman argues, however, 
that such a principle would require us to clutter our minds with all sorts of trivial 
consequences of our beliefs. We are agents with limited time, attention, and memory, and 
using these limited cognitive resources to believe trivialities would be, as Harman (1986) 
aptly puts it, “worse than pointless”. I’ll refer to this argument as the Clutter Argument 
against logical closure norms. 
 The Clutter Argument has attracted a great deal of support. Wallace (2001), 
Sainsbury ( 2002), DePaul (2004), MacFarlane (2004), White ( 2005), Douven (2010), 
Wedgewood (2012), Friedman  (2018) and Dogramaci (2018) all express some support 
for the thought that clutter considerations constrain what we should believe. Despite this 
widespread sympathy, there has been relatively little discussion outside of Friedman 
(2018) about what clutter is and exactly how the Clutter Argument works.  
 I argue here that it’s a mistake to reject logical closure norms on the basis of the 
Clutter Argument (though they might certainly be rejected on other grounds). In Section 
1, I unpack the idea of clutter, argue that Jane Friedman’s (2018) account of clutter 
misses the mark, and offer my own account. In Section 2, I discuss the normative 
significance of clutter and articulate what I take to be the most plausible clutter avoidance 
principle. In Section 3, I formulate the Clutter Argument and argue that it fails. Finally, I 
discuss the relevance of the Clutter Argument to weaker, more plausible logical closure 
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principles and sketch an alternative picture of an epistemic landscape where clutter 
avoidance and strong logical closure principles coexist. 
 1: What is Clutter? 
 In this section, I aim to clarify the notion of clutter. In 1.1, I introduce Harman’s 
notion of “cluttering the mind” and discuss what it means for a mind to be cluttered. In 
1.2, I discuss Friedman’s view, which identifies clutter with “junk beliefs,” and present 
several counterexamples to her view. Finally, in 1.3, I develop my own account of clutter, 
the waste view, which avoids the problems that face Friedman’s view. 
1.1 HOW CAN MINDS BE CLUTTERED? 
 
Harman suggests that certain trivial beliefs can “clutter” our minds: 
 
Many trivial things are implied by one's view which it would be worse than 
pointless to add to what one believes. For example, if one believes P, one's view 
trivially implies "either P or Q," "either P or P," "P and either P or R," and so on. 
There is no point in cluttering one's mind with all these propositions. (1986, p.12) 
 
 To dramatize Harman’s point, we can imagine a mirthless logician who attempts 
to do as logical closure norms bid him, spending hours upon hours believing ever more 
trivial consequences of his beliefs. This activity is pointless at best and outright irrational 
at worst. But what does it mean to say that the mirthless logician’s mind will be 
“cluttered” by all of these beliefs? Harman has this to say: 
 
 To suppose one's mind could become cluttered with beliefs is to suppose such 
things as (1) that it takes time to add to one's beliefs further propositions that are 
trivially implied by them, time that might be better spent on other things, and/or 
(2) that one has "limited storage capacity" for beliefs, so there is a limit on the 
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number of things one can believe, and/or (3) that there are limits on "information 
retrieval," so the more one believes the more difficult it is to recall relevant beliefs 
when one needs them.(1986, p.12) 
 
 The general picture is that clutter uses up limited cognitive resources which might 
have been used on more interesting or useful matters. Harman points to three such 
cognitive resources: time, storage capacity, and retrieval from memory. 
It’s easy to see that deliberating about and forming beliefs often requires some of 
our limited time.1 The case of storage capacity, however, is not so straightforward. 
Attempts to estimate of the storage capacity of the human brain are on shaky 
methodological ground and none give us reason to suppose that any actual humans run a 
risk of running out of space (Dudai 1997) As Michaelian (2011) notes, the capacity of 
human memory is “unlimited in practical terms,” whatever theoretical limits it may have. 
Limitations on storage capacity, then, do not constrain what we should believe. 
 The ability to retrieve information from memory looks more promising. 
“Retrieval-induced forgetting,” in which recalling certain items from a list causes 
impaired recall of other items from the list, is well-supported in the psychology 
literature.2 Most research on retrieval-induced forgetting uses category-exemplar pairs 
(i.e, fruit-lemon, animal-dog) as cues but the phenomenon appears to generalize to other 
sorts of cues, including arithmetic facts (Campbell and Thompson 2012; Campbell, 
Dufour, and Chen 2015), autobiographical memory (Barnier, Hung, and Conway 2004) , 
and location information (Gómez-Ariza, Fernandez, and Bajo 2012).3 However there are 
important caveats to this general result. First, there’s research that suggests that recalling 
some items from a list sometimes improves recall of the non-practiced items in the long 
term, a phenomenon called retrieval-induced facilitation (Chan, McDermott, and 
 
1 Some may worry that this applies only explicit and deliberative belief formation rather belief formation in 
general. I’ll discuss the cognitive burden of implicit beliefs in Section 3.4.  
2Murayama, et al. (2014) provides an overview and meta-analysis of research on retrieval-induced 
forgetting. 
3 These are particularly relevant because, unlike category-exemplar pairs, they are propositions and 
therefore could be the content of a belief. 
 7 
Roediger 2006; Chan 2009).  Second, the research suggests that it’s retrieving beliefs 
already stored in memory, rather than forming new beliefs that induces forgetting. It’s not 
clear, then, that retrieval-induced forgetting gives us reason to avoid forming trivial 
beliefs in the first place. The research bears out the idea that there are limitations on 
information retrieval from memory, but fails to support Harman’s suggestion that 
forming new beliefs taxes retrieval.  
  Research on directed attention fatigue suggests that attention is a resource that 
can be depleted, as well (Kaplan and Berman 2010). This, no doubt, is anecdotally 
obvious to those who have tried to cram for an exam or write careful philosophy for ten 
hours straight.  
To sum up, the cognitive resources that clutter squanders are time and attention. 
While appeals to storage capacity might seem natural given the clutter metaphor, there’s 
little reason to think actual human agents might run up against limits on storage capacity. 
Similarly, retrieval-induced forgetting does not constrain belief formation, since belief 
formation does not trigger forgetting. 
 We’ve seen how trivial beliefs can “clutter the mind” by using up limited 
cognitive resources. Now we can turn to the question of which beliefs clutter the mind. 
Harman focuses on trivial logical consequences because of their relevance to logical 
closure norms. However, Friedman rightly notes that trivial logical beliefs are not the 
only beliefs that squander our limited cognitive resources. Boring, useless beliefs about 
all sorts of topics are worth avoiding for precisely the same reasons as trivial logical 
consequences. An adequate account of clutter should follow Friedman in considering this 
wider class of “worse than useless” beliefs.  
 
 
1.2 THE JUNK VIEW 
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 Friedman defines “junk” as a subject matter in which an agent has no interest. 4 
To “have an interest” in this sense, is to either find a subject matter interesting, or to have 
“desires served by having beliefs (or knowing) about a subject matter” (2018). For 
instance, I have an interest in whether prickly pears are native to Texas because I find it 
interesting, but I have an interest in whether my rent is due on the 1st of each month 
because I’d like to avoid late fees, not because I find it particularly interesting. 
Friedman’s view, which I’ll call the junk view, takes junk beliefs to be the source of 
clutter. 
 
Friedman’s “clutter as junk” approach is straightforward and appealing. To avoid clutter, 
avoid junk beliefs, since these are boring and useless beliefs that waste our cognitive 
resources. However, the junk view fails to capture our intuitions about which beliefs 
should be avoided on clutter grounds.5 Consider the following example: 
 
Reluctant Belief: A window pops up on Paul’s computer screen. As Paul reads 
the text in the window, he sees that it presents an excellent argument for P from 
premises he believes. Paul refuses to give up his beliefs in the premises of the 
argument. Believing P would not cause Paul distress or distraction. He is 
conflicted about whether to believe that P on the basis of this argument that is 
excellent by his own lights because he has no interest whatsoever in whether P. 
Reluctantly, he comes to believe that P.6 
 
 P is junk, for Paul, because he has no interest in whether P. Nonetheless, 
intuitively Paul is at least permitted (if not required) to believe that P, after having 
 
4 A subject matter, in Friedman’s terminology, is the answer to a “whether” question -the set of a 
proposition and its negation. 
5 I’m supposing here that we have intuitions about which beliefs are clutter. The mirthless logician, 
inferring away, has beliefs that clearly tax his cognitive resources and gain him very little. Forming beliefs 
about how many grains of sand are in a handful picked up at random is similarly worse than useless. Our 
intuition is that these beliefs are to be avoided, because they squander our limited cognitive resources. 
6 Thanks to Matt Vermaire, Derek Haderlie, and Ian Proops for helpful comments on reworking this 
example. 
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considered excellent argument for it from premises that he believes. Once he has already 
invested the time and attention necessary to entertain P, appreciate the argument, and 
conclude that he wouldn’t give up his belief in any of the premises, believing that P 
would not further tax his cognitive resources. It may be that he should have avoided 
reading the pop-up at all, but this has little bearing on what he should do, having already 
read it. So, Paul’s belief is junk, but not clutter.  
   This points to a general problem: the junk view can’t distinguish junk beliefs that 
tax cognitive resources from those, like Paul’s, that don’t. This blind spot looks even 
more troubling when we consider cases where junk beliefs have a net positive effect on 
cognitive resources: 
 
Study Break: Evelyn is studying for an exam. After hitting the books for several 
hours, she finds herself distracted and fatigued. To clear her head, she walks to 
her window and spends five minutes slowly, meditatively counting the people in 
the courtyard. She forms a series of beliefs of the form “there are at least X people 
in the courtyard”. She is not interested in how many people are in the courtyard, 
nor does she have any desire served by having this information. When she 
resumes her studying, she has an easier time focusing and retains the material 
better than before her break.7 
 
  The beliefs that Evelyn forms about how many people are in the courtyard are 
junk, for her. Yet, while she did spend some cognitive resources to form these beliefs, she 
finishes her study break more able to attend to the material she’s trying to learn and will 
likely learn it faster as a result. That is, she ends up better off in terms of cognitive 
resources than she was before her break. It seems, then, that Evelyn’s beliefs are not 
clutter, so the junk view gets this case wrong.  
 
7 Brian Pollex pointed out in conversation that as soon as Evelyn sees that there are a bunch of people in the 
courtyard, she already implicitly believes “there is at least one person in the courtyard,” “there are at least 
two people in the courtyard.” Her later beliefs of this sort, however, will be genuinely formed as she 
counts. 
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One might contend that Evelyn does have desires served by having beliefs about 
how many people are in the courtyard: the desire to clear her head or the desire to study 
more effectively. This response requires a slight tweak to Friedman’s account of having 
an interest in a subject matter. An agent has an interest in a subject matter if the agent’s 
desires are served by forming, not by merely having, a belief about that subject matter. 
This captures the thought that a belief can serve a subject’s desires because of its content 
or because of the psychological effect of forming it. On this broader notion of having an 
interest, the matter of how many people are in the courtyard is not junk, for Evelyn.8 
Even though this information is not useful or interesting to her, the act of forming the 
beliefs can serve her desire to clear her head. The problem with this way of understanding 
the junk view is that it gets a modified Study Break Case wrong: 
 
No Break: Evelyn is studying for an exam. After hitting the books for several 
hours, she finds herself distracted and fatigued. Henry interrupts her studying to 
slowly count aloud the people in the courtyard. Evelyn waits impatiently as Henry 
informs her that there is at least one person in the courtyard, that there are at least 
two people in the courtyard, and so on. Evelyn returns to studying no less distracted 
and fatigued than before. 
 
Intuitively, the beliefs Evelyn forms on Henry’s testimony are clutter. They 
squander time and attention that she could have put to better use. Yet, these beliefs aren’t 
junk, because she has a desire that is served by forming a belief about the subject matter 
(in the more calming, meditative way). The issue here is that junk is too coarse-grained, 
since it is defined at the level of subject matters. The junk view, in either form, will give 
the same verdict in Study Break and No Break, since they involve the same agent with 
 
8 Strictly, each proposition of the form ‘there are X people in the courtyard’ and its negation 
comprise a distinct subject matter, on Friedman’s usage. 
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the same belief contents and interests. Our intuitions about clutter, however, differ the 
between the two cases.  
 While Study Break and Reluctant Belief show that not all junk beliefs are clutter, 
there’s also reason to think that junk beliefs aren’t the only beliefs that are clutter. 
Consider the following case: 
 
Plant Fan: Florencia spends several hours memorizing, for various plant species, 
whether they grow in New York. She finds each of these propositions slightly 
interesting. In order to learn all of these facts, she forgoes checking how her 
sister’s job search is going, which she’s deeply interested in, and learning a 
software she needs to know how to use for her job. 
 
  This is a massively unwise use of cognitive resources, all without forming a single 
junk belief. Clearly, Florencia’s beliefs are clutter, but because of her slight interest, they 
are not junk. If what I’ve said here is right, the junk view can’t capture our intuitions 
about which beliefs are clutter. Junk beliefs aren’t always clutter, as in Study Break and 
Reluctant Belief, and some clutter isn’t junk, like in Plant Fan. That is, while junk beliefs 
often contribute to clutter, clutter isn’t just junk.9  
1.3 THE WASTE VIEW 
  The reason the junk view misses the mark is that it does not take the cost of 
beliefs into account. As we saw in Study Break and Reluctant Belief, not every boring, 
useless belief taxes our cognitive resources. Further, Plant Fan shows that even slightly 
interesting beliefs can be clutter if they’re not interesting or important enough to justify 
the cognitive resources they require. An adequate account of clutter, then, will take the 
cost of belief into account. 
 
9 While the junk view comes apart from our clutter intuitions, this is no obstacle to Friedman’s more 
general point that a truly interest-driven epistemology will look drastically different than traditional 
epistemology.  
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 The waste view offers us a way to capture the value and the cost of a belief. The 
waste view is that beliefs that waste cognitive resources, or wasteful beliefs, are clutter. A 
belief is wasteful just in case its cost outweighs its value.  
 I think of the value of a belief as a graded analogue of interests, in Friedman’s 
sense. That is, the value of a belief that P, for an agent, depends on the degree to which 
forming a belief about whether P serves the agents desires and the degree to which the 
agent is interested in whether P. However, the waste view is compatible with other views 
about which beliefs have value (and how much), including veritism, the view that all and 
only true beliefs have value.10 
 The cost of a belief is most straightforwardly thought of in terms of the cognitive 
resources required to form it. In light of this, it may seem odd that it could “outweigh” 
the value of a belief. How are we to make sense of comparing a certain amount of time 
and degradation of attentional capacities to the value of a belief? The answer, I think, is 
that cognitive resources are only as valuable as what we can do with them. The cost of 
forming a given belief is equal to the value of the beliefs that the agent might have 
formed with the same cognitive resources, had they not formed the belief in question.11 
To put the point in a more forward-looking way, the cost of forming a belief is the value 
of the beliefs an agent would have to forgo to form it. In this way, we can directly 
compare the cost and the value of a belief, because cost is understood in terms of the 
value of beliefs.12  
 
10 See Berker (2013) for illuminating discussion of forms of veritism, which he attributes to Alvin Goldman 
(Goldman 1999). I opt for a notion more in line with Friedman’s here because I think it better captures the 
thought behind Harman’s Clutter Avoidance Principle and is more friendly to the Clutter Argument. 
11 I take “the beliefs an agent might have formed” to be restricted to close possible worlds. I take 
the cost of a belief to be determined by the highest value belief the agent might have formed (in a close 
possible world), rather than the sum of such beliefs.  
12 Why stop at the value of beliefs we forgo when determining the cost of a belief? After all, our time and 
attention are necessary for most of what is valuable, from close relationships to learning to personal 
hygiene. Similarly, Hannah Trees pointed out to me that everyday activities, like washing the dishes, could 
detract from forming valuable beliefs. Both of these issues arise because the mandate to use cognitive 
resources wisely is also important in the practical domain. I restrict the cost of a belief to the value of 
beliefs forgone, rather than other activities, because we need clutter and the clutter avoidance principle 
based on it to be plausibly epistemic in character. This is because if clutter avoidance turns out to be a 
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 The waste view is radically agent- and context-sensitive. The value of a belief 
depends on the agent’s interests. The cost of a belief depends on two things. First, it 
depends on how the belief was formed (or would be formed). Consider some proposition 
Q, which follows from my beliefs by a complicated proof and which has some small 
amount of value. Were I to form a belief that Q on the basis of expert testimony, the cost 
would be minimal, since forming beliefs by expert testimony requires very little in the 
way of cognitive resources (on my part). However, were I to spend the cognitive 
resources required work through the complicated proof myself, the cost would be much 
higher. So, for the very same agent and belief content, a belief could be wasteful or not 
wasteful depending on how it was formed. Second, the cost of a belief depends on the 
value of the beliefs an agent might have formed with the same resources. This, in turn, 
depends on the agent’s abilities, which determine which beliefs they might have formed, 
and the agent’s interests, which determine the value of the beliefs they might have 
formed. Both of these vary from agent to agent, and from time to time for the same agent, 
since an agent’s interests, desires, and which information best serves their desires can 
change. 
The waste view is incredibly sensitive to features of agents and their situations. 
This is because our clutter intuitions track the cost of belief, which depends on how the 
belief was formed and the agent’s abilities and practical situation. As a result, the waste 
view can accommodate our intuitions where the junk view struggles. In Reluctant Belief, 
Paul has already done all of the deliberating about P necessary to believe it (though 
perhaps he should have avoided doing so). Having done all that, there is no further cost to 
believing P, and so his belief is not wasteful. In Study Break, the cost of Evelyn’s beliefs 
is negative— her break replenishes her cognitive resources and allows her to learn more 
quickly. So, her beliefs are not wasteful. Evelyn and Paul’s beliefs are not wasteful 
because their cost does not outweigh their value, even though their beliefs are not 
particularly valuable. 
 
practical norm, not an epistemic one, it won’t be possible to make a compelling Clutter Argument, for 
reasons I discuss in Section 2.1.  
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 Similarly, the waste view, unlike the junk view, can make sense of how beliefs 
that have some value can still be worth avoiding on clutter grounds. In Plant Fan, 
Florencia’s beliefs about which plants grow in New York have some value. However, by 
spending her time and attention on those beliefs, she forgoes beliefs that she finds more 
interesting about her sister’s job search and beliefs about the software she needs to learn 
for work that better serve her practical aims. Her plant beliefs are valuable, but the beliefs 
she misses out on are much moreso. Her plant beliefs, therefore, are wasteful. 
 In the following section, I discuss how we should make sense of the Clutter 
Avoidance norm that Harman proposes. In doing so, I rely on the waste view. 
2: The Normative Significance of Clutter 
 
 What demands do clutter considerations make on our epistemic practices? 
Harman suggests the following principle: 
 
Clutter Avoidance: One ought not clutter one’s mind with trivialities. (1989, 
p.12) 
 
This principle leaves several important issues open. Can I clutter my mind by believing a 
single triviality or do I clutter my mind only when I believe too many trivialities? Is 
Clutter Avoidance a norm itself, or does it merely constrain norms? The Clutter 
Argument purports to leverage inconsistency between Clutter Avoidance and logical 
closure norms to show that we must abandon the latter. This requires figuring out exactly 
which beliefs or norms conflict with Clutter Avoidance. For that, we need a more precise 
clutter principle. 
 In this section, I explore the normative significance of clutter, understood 
according to the waste view. I discuss a variety of clutter principles and attempt to 
illuminate the choice points available to clutter theorists. These considerations will lead 
to the clutter principle I use to formulate the Clutter Argument in Section 3.  
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2.1: ARE CLUTTER PRINCIPLES REALLY EPISTEMIC? 
 
 A common reaction to Clutter Avoidance is that it isn’t really epistemic. Instead, 
the thought goes, it’s a practical norm that happens to concern the epistemic end of 
(justified) belief formation.13 Whether something is clutter doesn’t have anything to do 
with whether it’s true or likely to be true. Similarly, the formal and evidential 
relationships between beliefs have no bearing on whether a belief is clutter or not. What’s 
worse, the view that best captures our intuitions about clutter, the waste view, looks 
suspiciously like an expected value calculation. 
 If clutter were, at bottom, practical, this would pose a serious problem for the 
Clutter Argument. The Clutter Argument, roughly, says that clutter norms conflict with 
logical closure norms, and so one of them— the logical closure norm— has to go. If 
clutter and closure norms are from different normative domains, however, then this 
conflict doesn’t mean much. Norms from different domains conflict regularly, and this is 
not typically damning for the conflicting norms. For instance, the action recommended by 
prudential norms often differs from the action recommended by moral norms. Yet this 
fact is not, on its own, reason to reconsider any of the relevant prudential or moral norms. 
Similarly, a conflict between a practical and an epistemic norm gives us little reason to 
abandon either. 
 Luckily for fans of the Clutter Argument and enemies of closure norms alike, the 
case for clutter norms being non-epistemic is not as straightforward as it may seem. 
There are plenty of norms that are central to our epistemic lives that have some practical 
character: the norms of inquiry or zetetic norms.14 Making wise use of the resources we 
require to deliberate, investigate, and form beliefs is part of being a good inquirer. 
Inquiry is a central activity (if not the central) activity of our epistemic lives. How to 
characterize norms of inquiry and how to distinguish them from traditional epistemic 
 
13 Roger White (2005) refers to clutter avoidance as a “practical reason” not to take certain 
attitudes (p.457).  
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norms (if indeed we can) is beyond the scope of this paper.15 For now, however, it 
suffices to say the practical flavor of clutter principles does not necessarily mean that 
they are not epistemic. In the next section, however, I explore a strategy to avoid the 
issue of whether clutter principles are really epistemic altogether. 
2.2 THE WIDE WORLD OF CLUTTER PRINCIPLES 
 
 Even with a clear picture of which beliefs contribute to clutter, exactly what a 
plausible clutter principle looks like remains hazy. The first choice we face is whether to 
think of a clutter principle as a norm on rational belief or, as Harman suggests, a 
“metaprinciple that contrains norms on belief revision” Harman, Change in View. The 
second is whether a clutter principle should be strict or lenient. A strict clutter principle 
would prohibit all wasteful beliefs. A lenient clutter principle, on the other hand, would 
prohibit forming too many wasteful beliefs or wasting too many cognitive resources. 
Finally, if we choose a clutter principle that constrains norms of revision, as Harman 
suggests, we must decide whether our principle will rule out only norms that require 
clutter, or norms that merely permit clutter, as well. I’ll address each of these choice 
points in turn.  
 Harman suggests that Clutter Avoidance is not a norm itself, but a principle that 
rules out norms of revision, or dynamic norms. Such a constraint on dynamic norms is 
not a norm itself, but a theorist’s tool that guides us in determining what the dynamic 
norms are (or could be).16 It tells us not what to believe, but which candidate norms are 
not correct norms.17 Harman offers the following case in support of understanding Clutter 
Avoidance as a constraint on dynamic norms: 
 
15 Jane Friedman’s “The Epistemic and the Zetetic” (forthcoming) is an illuminating discussion of norms of 
inquiry and how they relate to traditional epistemic norms. 
16 Sinan Dogramaci helpfully noted that “metanormative” and “metaprinciple” are inapt (since a constraint 
on dynamic norms is neither a norm about norms or a principle about principles) and unnecessary. I’ll refer 
to a principle that rules out candidate dynamic norms as a “constraint on dynamic norms” or simply a 
“constraint.” 
17 I’m using “correct norm”for a norm that actually governs us or our beliefs, distinct from something 
which has the form of a norm, which I’ll call a “candidate norm.”  
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Suppose George is trying to convince Bob that P. George shows Bob that P is a 
deductive consequence of things he  believes. Bob accepts the validity of 
George’s argument and refuses to change his belief in any of the premises, but he 
also refuses to accept the conclusion P, citing clutter avoidance as his reason for 
refusing. (Harman 1986) 
 
Bob cites clutter considerations as a reason not to believe something which, by his own 
lights, his beliefs strongly support, a defense which Harman rightly calls “absurd.” The 
thought is that norms are the sort of thing we appeal to in defense of our attitudes and 
make use of in explicit reasoning. Constraints on dynamic norms on the other hand, are 
theorist’s posits, and therefore not the kind of think we should appeal to in defense of our 
beliefs. Bob’s appeal to clutter avoidance is inappropriate because clutter avoidance is 
not a norm, but a constraint on norms.18  
 Opting for a constraint rather than a norm has a further advantage: it allows us to 
sidestep the question of whether a clutter principle is properly epistemic. First, if we think 
of constraints as principles that guide our theorizing, it’s not clear that a constraint 
belongs to a normative domain at all. Second, even supposing that a clutter constraint is 
practical in some sense, this is no obstacle to its constraining our theorizing about 
epistemic norms. Practical concerns constrain our theorizing in a number of normative 
domains such as the moral and the legal. For instance, an “ought-implies-can” principle 
constrains moral theorizing, yet it is at bottom a practical constraint. So, if a clutter 
principle is a constraint on norms, not a norm itself, it can constrain the epistemic, 
whatever practical character it may have. 
 
18 It’s not entirely obvious that a constraint on dynamic norms does fare better in this respect. Such 
constraints might just as easily figure in explicit reasoning. Bob could have defended his refusal to believe 
P on the grounds that it’s trivial and he has no interest in it, and therefore the correct dynamic norms don’t 
require that he believe it. Whether this would be appropriate or not depends on how our answers to 
theoretical questions in epistemology bear on what we should believe, an issue I won’t attempt to resolve 
here. 
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 The second choice point we face is whether our clutter constraint is strict or 
lenient. A strict clutter constraint would rule out any candidate norm that requires agents 
to form any wasteful beliefs. A lenient constraint would allow candidate norms that 
require agents to waste some cognitive resources, but rule out norms that require agents 
to waste too much.19 I think the answer here must be lenient for two reasons. First, 
consider a norm that requires that we believe only the non-wasteful consequences of our 
beliefs except: we must believe ‘P or not-P’ (for some P). This is an unnatural, 
gerrymandered norm, to be sure, but the question here is whether we want to rule out this 
norm on clutter grounds. For some agents, this norm will not require any wasteful beliefs, 
while for others it will require only one. It seems odd to rule out this norm on clutter 
grounds because a single, simple wasteful belief doesn’t doom an agent to suffer the bad 
consequences of clutter. A single wasteful belief does not waste much time, and it won’t, 
on its own, exhaust our attentional capacity. A norm can require a single wasteful belief 
without requiring that agents suffer any of the bad consequences that come with forming 
too many wasteful beliefs. If it’s these bad consequences that explain why we should 
avoid clutter, then a single wasteful belief here or there is not enough to rule out a 
candidate norm on grounds of clutter.  
 There is also dialectical reason to take the clutter constraint to be lenient. As 
Friedman notes in her discussion of Clutter Avoidance, if we rule out every norm that 
requires even a single clutter-y belief, then Clutter Avoidance rules our most of our 
familiar epistemic norms, like evidentialist norms and more modest closure norms. For 
instance, consider an evidentialist norm that requires us to believe whatever is well-
supported by our evidence. For most of us, there are at least some propositions that are 
well-supported by our evidence but would be wasteful to believe. If we want a 
convincing Clutter Argument, then, we should avoid a clutter constraint so strong it rules 
out most of the norms epistemologists are interested in. So, we should take our clutter 
constraint to be lenient.  
 
19 I’ve switched from talk of “wasteful beliefs” to “wasted cognitive resources” because the relevant 
question is not how many wasteful beliefs, but how much is wasted in terms of cognitive resources. 
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 The final choice we must make is whether our clutter constraint should rule out 
norms that merely permit wasting cognitive resources, or only norms that require wasting 
cognitive resources. John MacFarlane (2004) and Sinan Dogramaci (2018) favor the idea 
that well-supported but trivial or boring beliefs are permissible but not required. The 
“requirement only” approach captures the idea that following epistemic norms should be 
consistent with avoiding clutter. We can always follow norms that issue permissions and 
avoid clutter by simply avoiding the wasteful permitted beliefs. On the other hand, if it’s 
bad to waste cognitive resources, why should the correct dynamic norms permit us to do 
so? Friedman argues that clutter avoidance should be understood as ruling out norms that 
permit clutter (or junk, on Friedman’s view) as well as those that require clutter. 
 Harman’s compelling thought isn’t that you don’t have to believe all that junk, but 
that’s it’s perfectly rationally permissible for you to, rather his thought is that you should 
avoid believing junk. That’s to say that it’s not rational to clutter your mind, and you 
shouldn’t do it. But the thought that believing junk is permitted, but not required, leaves it 
perfectly rationally permissible to clutter your mind. (2018, p.572) 
  The contrast between a “requirement only” and a “requirement and permission” 
clutter principle is an important issue. However, the larger goal of this paper is to 
formulate and evaluate the Clutter Argument against a logical closure norm that issues 
requirements. If such a norm requires us to clutter our minds, the Clutter Argument will 
go through whether or not the clutter principle rules out norms that permit clutter. While 
I’m most sypathetic to Friedman’s “requirement and permission” approach here, I’ll use 
the more modest clutter principle that only rules out norms that issue requirements in 
hopes of formulating the Clutter Argument in a way that appeals to the broadest 
audience.  
 Our clutter principle, then, is a lenient constraint that rules out candidate dynamic 
norms that require agents to waste too many cognitive resources. That is, our clutter 
principle will look like the following: 
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Clutter Constraint: If a dynamic norm requires one to waste significant 
cognitive resources, then it is not a correct dynamic norm for one. 
 
  Exactly which norms run afoul of Clutter Constraint is somewhat thorny. The 
dynamic norms we’re concerned with require forming beliefs with certain content. But as 
noted in Section 1.3, whether a belief is wasteful depends on how it is formed, in addition 
to its content. That is, for the same agent at the same time, a belief with a given content 
would be wasteful if formed in some ways, and not wasteful if formed in others. This 
feature is an advantage of the waste view— our intuitions about which beliefs are clutter 
are sensitive to how beliefs are formed. Unfortunately, though, it does make it difficult to 
say whether forming a belief with a given content will waste an agent’s cognitive 
resources. This, in turn, makes it difficult to determine which norms Clutter Constraint 
rules out.  
 I offer the following heuristic to test whether a norm will be ruled out by Clutter 
Constraint. For a candidate dynamic norm, consider how an agent typically follows it, 
when they do. If an agent would waste significant cognitive resources consistently 
following a candidate norm in the way they typically follow it (when they do), then 
Clutter Constraint rules out that norm.  
 Determining how significant a waste is significant will inevitably require recourse 
to our intuitions about which uses of cognitive resources are good and which are not. 
However, as a rule of thumb, we can say that a dynamic norm should be ruled out on 
clutter grounds when conforming with it would require an agent to waste significant 
cognitive resources, where a “significant” waste is understood to be enough cognitive 
resources that it hampers or disturbs of some normal or desirable epistemic practice. That 
is, when clutter gets in the way, it’s too much clutter. 
 
3: The Clutter Argument 
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 In this section, I formulate what I take to be the most compelling version of the 
Clutter Argument and argue that it fails. In 3.1, I address the question of which logical 
closure norm is the target of the Clutter Argument. In 3.2, I formulate the Clutter 
Argument. In 3.3 I consider various principles that might motivate the crucial premise of 
the Clutter Argument. Finally, in 3.4 I argue that we have reason to think that the Clutter 
Argument is unsound. 
 
3.1 THE TARGET OF THE CLUTTER ARGUMENT 
 
Harman offers the following principle as the target of the Clutter Argument: 
 
Logical Closure Principle: One’s beliefs should be “closed under logical 
implication.” In other words there is something wrong with one’s beliefs if there 
is a proposition logically implied by them that one does not already believe. In 
that case one should either add the implied proposition to one’s beliefs of give up 
one of the implying beliefs. (Harman 1986) 
 
Logical Closure principle is, in fact, two distinct norms. One is a static norm which tells 
us how our beliefs should be, at a given time: 
 
 Static Closure: One’s beliefs should be closed under logical implication. 
 
The other norm is a dynamic norm that tells us how we should revise our beliefs, having 
found that we fail to meet Static Closure: 
 
Dynamic Closure: If there is a proposition implied by one’s beliefs that one does 
not already believe, then one should either add the implied proposition to one’s 
beliefs of give up one of the implying beliefs. 
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 Dynamic Closure and Static Closure differ beyond being dynamic and static, 
respectively.  Static Closure is an ideal norm, in that its requirement does not take human 
limitations into account.   Dynamic Closure, on the other hand, is a non-ideal norm.  It 
kicks in, so to speak, only when an agent has failed to meet an ideal norm, Static Closure.  
As Declan Smithies puts it, non-ideal norms are “approximations towards ideal standards 
that take our contingent human limitations into account” (2015).  Non-ideal norms 
capture our “ordinary standards of rationality” on the basis of which we praise or blame 
human agents (all of whom fail to meet the ideal standards).  While the non-ideal norms 
are, of course, guided by the ideal norms, as we’ll see in Section 3.3, the relationship 
between them is difficult to articulate. 
 The most important question for our current purposes is which closure principle 
will make for the most compelling, dialectically effective argument. The answer is Static 
Closure.  
 First, those who are interested in logical closure are typically interested in Static 
Closure, not dynamic closure. Theorists of ideal rationality have typically conceived of 
ideal rationality in terms of how the ideally rational agent would believe (at a time) and 
supposed this will constrain how ideal and non-ideal agents should reason, but not the 
other way around. David Christensen suggests that this is because the fact that something 
is wrong with one’s beliefs at a given time is what motivates revising one’s beliefs at all 
(2004).  Further, the formal systems that often motivate strong closure norms rely on 
static, not dynamic, closure principles. Formal models of belief change, such as dynamic 
epistemic logic or AGM models of belief revision, offer ideal dynamic norms for agents 
who already meet Static Closure, rather than non-ideal norms like Dynamic Closure. 
 Second, a Clutter Argument against Dynamic Closure is unlikely to work.  
Dynamic Closure requires that, if there is some proposition implied by an agent’s beliefs, 
that they either come to believe it, or give up the implying beliefs.    This means, 
however, that an agent can perfectly well accord with Dynamic Closure by relinquishing 
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ever more of their beliefs.20  Continual pruning of one’s beliefs will not “clutter one’s 
mind with trivialities,” as Harman feared. While I’ll argue shortly that the Clutter 
Argument against Static Closure fails as well, it does at least seem fairly promising.  
After all, Static Closure requires that we believe infinitely many things, many of them 
boring and useless.  
 The upshot of these considerations is that an airtight argument against Dynamic 
Closure would be of little consequence to friends of closure norms, who tend to be 
committed to Static Closure or similar static norms. Instead, an effective Clutter 
Argument must take Static Closure as its target. 
3.2 THE CLUTTER ARGUMENT 
 
 As I discussed in Section 2, most plausible clutter principle, Clutter Constraint, 
rules out dynamic norms, not static norms. The target of the Clutter Argument, however, 
is Static Closure, a static norm. How then, is the Clutter Argument meant to go?  Harman 
does not address this issue, possibly because his own Logical Closure Principle included 
a dynamic norm.  However, I’ll offer a strategy for overcoming this issue in formulating 
the Clutter Argument: employing a principle about how the non-ideal dynamic norms 
relate to the ideal norms.  
 Static Closure, on its own, does not imply anything about how we should revise 
our beliefs. However, it seems clear that committing to a norm like Static Closure 
commits us to something about what the non-ideal dynamic norms are like. I’ll refer the 
dynamic norms that must be true if Static Closure is, whatever they may be, as ‘the Non-
 
20 Logical truths somewhat complicate the matter here.  While logical truths are implied by 
anything, even the empty proposition, actual human could continue conforming with Dynamic Closure for 
the whole of their lifetime without running out of beliefs to jettison.  Second, it’s not clear that one’s beliefs 
imply anything if one has no beliefs.  The empty proposition implies all logical truths, but the agent need 
not believe the empty proposition. 
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Ideal Dynamic Norms’. By doing this, we can talk generally about features these norms 
must have while remaining neutral on exactly which norms they are. 
 With this bit of shorthand in place, we can formulate the argument from Clutter 
Constraint against Static Closure. 
 
The Clutter Argument 
1. If a dynamic norm requires wasting significant cognitive resources, then it is not 
a correct dynamic norm. (Clutter Constraint) 
2. If Static Closure is a correct norm, then the Non-Ideal Dynamic Norms are 
correct dynamic norms.  
3. The Non-Ideal Dynamic Norms require wasting significant cognitive resources. 
4. The Non-Ideal Dynamic Norms are not correct norms. (3, 1) 
C. Static Closure is not a correct norm. (2, 4) 
 
 In other words, if the Non-Ideal Dynamic Norms would require that one waste 
significant cognitive resources, then they are ruled out by Clutter Constraint. If the Non-
Ideal Dynamic Norms aren’t correct norms, then neither is Static Closure.   
 It’s worth noting that what’s wasteful for one person may not be wasteful for an 
agent with different capabilities and interests.  I’ll assume in what follows that a norm 
“requires wasting significant resources” if a human with typical capacities would waste 
significant cognitive resources by following it in the way they typically do (to the extent 
that they do).   
 The crucial question in evaluating the Clutter Argument is whether we have 
reason to accept Premise 3. Premise 1 is the clutter principle that I argue for in Section 2. 
Premise 2 is trivial given how I’ve stipulated the meaning of “Non-Ideal Dynamic 
Norms.” Premise 3 is the claim that believing as we ought to, if Static Closure is true, 
will waste significant cognitive resources. This the key claim of the Clutter Argument: 
that Static Closure requires agents to clutter their minds. 
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3.3: THE DYNAMIC AND THE STATIC NORMS 
  
Premise 3 is a claim about the Non-Ideal Dynamic Norms—that is, about the non-
ideal dynamic norms that must be the case if Static Closure is true. However, there are 
plenty of non-ideal dynamic norms that are obviously related to Static Closure that 
clearly need not waste significant resources.  For instance, “form a belief in a logical 
consequence of your beliefs just in case it would not be wasteful.”  Or consider, “if you 
are inquiring about whether P and P follows from your beliefs, believe that P,” which 
leaves open that you shouldn’t be inquiring about matters that are not sufficiently 
interesting or practically important.    
This suggests a response to the Clutter Argument for advocates the Static Closure: 
simply insist that the Non-ideal Dynamic Norms are among the many norms that, in some 
sense, aim at Static Closure, but do not waste significant cognitive resources.  Smithies, 
an advocate of Static Closure as an ideal norm, characterizes non-ideal norms as 
“approximations towards ideal standards that take our contingent human limitations into 
account” (2015).  Our limited attention, time, and ability to retrieve information from 
memory are among our contingent human limitations.  On this picture, then, it seems 
perfectly natural to say that the Non-Ideal Dynamic Norms will not require us to waste 
significant cognitive resources, for if they did, they would not successfully take our 
human limitations into account.   
To block this sort of response we could, of course, stipulate that taking our 
limitations into account is only a matter of taking our abilities into account. The non-ideal 
norms are norms that, under normal conditions, we can abide by, but doing so may well 
be very costly in terms of cognitive resources.  Without some reason to consider our 
limitations in this narrow way, however, this response seems ad hoc.  In order to motivate 
Premise 3 in a more principled way, we need a “bridge principle” that characterizes the 
connection between static ideal norms and non-ideal dynamic norms in general.   
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One straightforward bridge principle says that the non-ideal dynamic norms 
should get agents to meet the ideal static norms: 
 
Success: Consistently following the non-ideal dynamic norms will lead a human 
agent to meet the ideal static norms. 
 
  Success relies on an ought-implies-can principle about ideal static norms. There 
are no dynamic norms that will get a human agent to meet Static Closure, because no 
human agent can meet Static Closure. This poses two problems. First, defenders of Static 
Closure (and other strong closure and consistency norms) are well aware that human 
agents can’t meet Static Closure, yet nonetheless think Static Closure is a correct norm.21 
That is, no defender of Static Closure would accept Success. If we want to convince 
people who think Static Closure might be right, we can’t rely on Success. Second and 
more importantly, Success isn’t sufficient to make Premise 3 true. Since there are no 
dynamic norms that will allow a human agent to meet Static Closure, ‘the Non-Ideal 
Dynamic Norms’ has no referent. This will make Premise 3 false (or indeterminate, 
depending on one’s view of non-referring terms). 
We can capture the general spirit of Success with a weaker principle: 
   
Long-Run Success: The non-ideal dynamic norms lead to the ideal static norms 
in the long-run.22 
 
 Long-Run Success does not imply that any human agent can meet the static norms, since 
we will all stop following the dynamic norms, at some point. Long-Run Success, applied 
 
21 For an illuminating discussion of why many reject epistemic ought-implies-can principles (and 
alternatives to doing so), see Smithies (2005). 
22 The construction “lead to” may seem a bit odd. I’m supposing here that the dynamic norms of some sort 
of form (logical or otherwise) that allows us to abstract somewhat from specific followings by specific 
agents. For instance, if the dynamic norms are things like modus ponens and disjunctive syllogism, it seems 
perfectly coherent to talk about where these norms “lead” beyond human capabilities.  
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to Static Closure, says that the Non-Ideal Dynamic Norms would, if followed forever, 
require that an agent believe every logical consequence of their beliefs. For a mortal 
human agent, Long-Run Success means that the Non-Ideal Dynamic Norms will require 
that they believe ever more logical consequences, but not all of them.  
 A weaker bridge principle than Long-Run Success will not be sufficient to 
motivate Premise 3. Take, for instance, the following (still quite strong) bridge principle: 
 
Improvement: Following the non-ideal dynamic norms will leave one always 
better off with respect to the ideal static norms. 
 
Consider the dynamic norm “believe all the consequences of your beliefs except for the 
wasteful ones.” Following this norm would leave you always better off with respect to 
Static Logical Closure. However, forming beliefs in only non-wasteful consequences 
would, obviously, not waste significant cognitive resources. So, Improvement fails to 
support Premise 3. A stronger bridge principle than Long-Run Success, however, risks 
having “the Non-Ideal Dynamic Norms” fail to refer, as is the case with Success. 
 I argue in the following section that, even if Long-Run Success is true, Premise 3 
is false. However, it’s worth considering a preliminary reason to think that Long-Run 
Success is not sufficient to make Premise 3 true. If Long-Run Success is right, the Non-
Ideal Dynamic Norms may well have familiar logical forms, like “if you believe P and 
believe ‘if P then Q’ and Q is not absurd, you ought to form a belief that Q” or “if you 
believe P, believe ‘P or Q’.” It seems natural that that norms modeled on natural 
deduction rules would lead to Static Closure in the way that Long-Run Success requires. 
These norms require that I believe certain logical consequences of my beliefs. They 
don’t, however, require that I form these beliefs fast, that I form them soon, that I give up 
other pursuits to form them, or that devote lots of time to forming beliefs by this modus 
ponens norm. Because Static Closure itself is so demanding, there is a tendency to think 
that the Non-Ideal Dynamic Norms must require us to chug away endlessly like the 
mirthless logician. However, Long-Run Success leaves open that the Non-Ideal Dynamic 
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Norms are familiar norms that look very much like modus ponens and disjunction 
introduction. These norms do require quite a lot, but it’s not clear that we couldn’t follow 
them consistently for the whole of our lifetimes without running out of interesting, useful, 
non-wasteful beliefs to form.  
3.4 IMPLICIT BELIEF AND THE CLUTTER ARGUMENT 
 
 Premise 3 says that the Non-Ideal Dynamic Norms will require that one waste 
significant cognitive resources. I suggested in the previous section that if Long-Run 
Success is correct, the Non-Ideal Dynamic Norms will require that we believe ever more 
consequences of our beliefs, but not all of the consequences of our beliefs. That is, the 
Non-Ideal Dynamic Norms lead to Static Closure in the long-run, but actual human 
agents can only follow these norms for some finite amount of time. In order to evaluate 
Premise 3 for human agents then, we need to look at how actual human agents go about 
following norms that require believing logical consequences of their beliefs, when they 
do, and ask whether these norms will require wasting significant cognitive resources. I 
use a familiar norm based on disjunction introduction as examples, but nothing I say 
depends on this particular norm being among the Non-Ideal Dynamic Norms. 
 We typically believe logical consequences of our beliefs implicitly, not explicitly. 
Explicit beliefs are beliefs the contents of which are represented in the mind, whether in 
conscious thought or in memory.  Implicit beliefs are beliefs that are not explicitly 
represented in the mind.23 You believe (and believed before reading this) that the table 
nearest to you does not have a gooey nougat center, despite the fact that until a moment 
ago, you likely had never so much as entertained it. Since you likely had never explicitly 
represented in your mind the proposition that that the table nearest to you does not have a 
gooey nougat center, this belief was implicit (though it’s explicit now). For the purposes 
 
23 The implicit/explicit distinction is often confused with the dispositional/occurrent distinction, but they 
are importantly different. Roughly, beliefs are occurrent iff they are (currently) the content of a conscious 
thought, and dispositional otherwise. All ocurrent beliefs, therefore, are necessarily explicit, since being the 
content of an occurrent thought is one way to be explicitly represented in the mind. Dispositional beliefs, 
however, may be explicit (in the case of beliefs stored in memory) or implicit.  
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of the present discussion, I’ll assume the view, due to Hartry Field (1978), that we 
implicitly believe the obvious consequences (deductive or otherwise) of our explicit 
beliefs, though nothing I say hangs on this account of implicit belief.24  Whether an agent 
implicitly believes P depends on whether it is sufficiently obvious to her, not on whether 
it follows from her other beliefs by an obvious step. 
 To see that our beliefs about logical consequences of our beliefs are by-and-large 
implicit, consider the subset of consequences that follow by disjunction introduction. 
When I come to explicitly believe some proposition P, I come to implicitly believe 
obvious consequences of P. Since many (but not all) instances of disjunction introduction 
are obvious to me, I will come to implicitly believe a massive number of disjunctions 
with P as a disjunct. In fact, I’ll come to implicitly believe infinite disjunctions with P as 
a disjunct, because there are infinite disjunctions of P and other sentences that I can easily 
understand and any of these will be obvious to me, given my general understanding of 
disjunction introduction (though this won’t be true for agents without this general 
understanding).25 The general picture here is that for each of our explicit beliefs, we have 
a massive, in some cases infinite, number of implicit belief about their obvious 
consequences. No matter how many consequences of our beliefs we explicitly believe, 
then, we’ll implicitly believe many, many more. 
 The question at hand is whether following the Non-Ideal Dynamic Norms 
involves wasting significant cognitive resources, as Premise 3 says. Since we 
overwhelmingly believe logical consequences of our beliefs implicitly, the question of 
whether the Non-Ideal Dynamic Norms require us to waste significant cognitive 
resources amounts to the question of whether implicitly believing logical consequences 
of our beliefs involves wasting significant cognitive resources. We form implicit beliefs 
 
24 For other accounts of implicit belief, see Daniel Dennett (1975) and Mark Crimmins (2002). 
25 In some cases it will be indeterminate which norm an agent is following by implicitly believing. To see 
this, consider consequence, Q, that follows from my explicit beliefs by two distinct patterns of reasoning, 
each of which would be sufficient to make Q obvious to me. We can imagine that in some contexts in 
which the matter of whether Q came up, I might use one pattern of reasoning to get to Q, while in other 
contexts, I might use the other.  
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in two main ways: by forming new explicit beliefs and by improving at reasoning.26 In 
arguing that implicitly believing ever more logical consequences doesn’t require 
significant cognitive resources, I’ll consider in turn the ways that we form new implicit 
beliefs. 
 The first way we form implicit beliefs is by improving at reasoning. As we 
improve at employing certain patterns of reasoning, more and more consequences that 
follow by that pattern become sufficiently obvious as to be implicit beliefs. For instance, 
consider a beginning logic student who sometimes uses disjunction introduction in 
reasoning. He learns in logic class that disjunction introduction is a good rule in general, 
and practices recognizing consequences that follow by disjunction introduction. The 
more adept he becomes at recognizing these consequences, the more obvious such 
consequences become. So, by getting better at applying this rule, he’ll come to believe 
huge swaths of consequences that follow by disjunction introduction. Improving at 
reasoning requires some time and attention. However, we can improve at reasoning by 
doing things like balancing our budget, playing chess, or reasoning carefully about things 
that are of great interest to us. Cognitive resources put to these uses are not wasted, 
because these activities and the beliefs formed while doing them are valuable to the 
agents that pursue them. If we can form implicit beliefs about logical consequences of 
our beliefs, as the Non-Ideal Dynamic Norms require, by doing whichever reasoning-
improving activity we like, then it does not appear we’ll waste significant cognitive 
resources by following the Non-Ideal Dynamic norms. 
 The second way we form new implicit beliefs by forming new explicit beliefs. 
When I form an explicit belief that R, I come to implicitly believe obvious consequences 
of R (that weren’t obvious consequences of my beliefs before believing R). Forming new 
explicit beliefs typically requires at least a little time and attention. The question then is 
whether we need to form many wasteful explicit beliefs in order to follow the Non-Ideal 
 
26 We also form new implicit beliefs by conceptual enrichment. If I lack the “maple” concept, and then gain 
it, I’ll thereby gain lots of new implicit beliefs involving that concept (like “nothing made of glass is a 
maple” and “the oak in my backyard is not a maple”). I’ve left implicit belief formation by conceptual 
enrichment out of my discussion, because it doesn’t apply to our new beliefs in logical consequences. 
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Dynamic Norms. The answer is no, because we can follow the Non-Ideal Dynamic 
Norms by improving at reasoning and by forming non-wasteful explicit beliefs about 
matters that interest us.  This won’t, in the end, lead us to believe all of the consequences 
of our belief, but all the Non-Ideal Dynamic Norms (according to Long-Run Success) is 
that we continue believing more consequences of our beliefs.  This, it seems, we can do 
without wasting significant cognitive resources. 
One might object here that we are not able to get ever closer to meeting Static 
Closure without running into a proposition that requires us to waste some cognitive 
resources.  At some point, the consequences that can be believed implicitly will run out 
and we will be left inferring away like the mirthless logician. However, it’s important to 
note that our beliefs are not fixed over time.  We will continue to form more beliefs about 
our surroundings, daily lives, the news, and so on.  Each of these new beliefs will have a 
vast number of consequences, which we can come to believe by following the Non-Ideal 
Dynamic Norms (implicitly or explicitly).   So, there is little reason to think that we 
might reach a point where, in order to follow the Non-Ideal Dynamic Norms, we would 
have to start believing ever more difficult or complicated consequences of our beliefs.27   
 Premise 3 of the Clutter Argument says that the Non-Ideal Dynamic norms will 
require agents to waste significant cognitive resources. However, when we look at how 
we in fact come to believe most of the logical consequences of our beliefs that we do, it’s 
not at all clear that this is the case. We believe new logical consequences of our beliefs 
mostly implicitly, and we can form these beliefs without significant wasted time or 
attention. Therefore, Premise 3 is false, and the Clutter Argument is unsound. 
 For those who would defend the Clutter Argument despite this objection, a clear 
strategy presents itself.  Find a bridge principle between the ideal static and non-ideal 
dynamic norms that is plausible and delivers the result the Non-Ideal Dynamic Norms 
will clutter the mind of humans like us, and you have a successful Clutter Argument.  
Nonetheless, I’m not optimistic that a bridge principle strong enough to make the Clutter 
 
27 Snow Zhang suggested this line of reply in conversation.   
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Argument work would be plausible.  My own attempts to find one have not been fruitful 
and it’s difficult to see how such a principle would remedy the issue short of outright 
requiring explicit belief. 
4: Conclusion 
 Most philosophers who’ve addressed clutter considerations have expressed 
support for or explicitly endorsed the idea that clutter provides a reason to reject or 
rethink logical closure norms.28 I’ve argued that this is a mistake. When we look at how 
we in fact believe logical consequence of our beliefs, it’s clear that making consistent 
progress towards Static Closure does not put us in danger of cluttering our minds. This is 
because we typically believe these things implicitly, which requires relatively little in the 
way of cognitive resources. What’s more, one way we form these beliefs is by improving 
at reasoning, and it’s difficult to see how this could be bad, from the point of view of 
rationality. 
 Static Closure is just about the strongest closure norm on offer. Those who reject 
it might nonetheless want to accept a weaker closure norm that requires that we believe 
all obvious or known consequences.29 These weaker norms are subject to versions of the 
Clutter Argument, since not all obvious or known consequences will be interesting or of 
practical importance. However, there’s reason to think that these versions of the Clutter 
Argument will fail for the same reason as the Clutter Argument against Static Closure. 
So, the arguments presented here may vindicate weaker closure norms, as well. 
 The Clutter Argument, were it successful, would leverage clutter considerations to 
show that Static Logical Closure could not apply to us human agents with limited time 
and attention. However, this is not the only way we might make sense of what our 
cognitive limitations impose on our epistemic practice. Advocates of Clutter Avoidance 
might make the same move that advocates of closure norms do: treating it as an ideal. 
 
28 In fact, to my knowledge, all of the philosophers who have discussed the Clutter Argument are fairly 
sympathetic towards it. 
29 “Known consequence” here means a proposition that an agent knows to follow from her beliefs, not a 
consequence of her beliefs that is already known (since it would be trivial to require belief for these). 
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That is, we might consider it ideal in some sense to never have a belief about something 
in which we have no interest or that wastes cognitive resources. This however, would not 
in general mean that an agent who believes uninteresting propositions is thereby irrational 
in every case or that, all things considered, she ought not believe an uninteresting 
proposition. Instead, Clutter Avoidance (here understood as a norm rather than a 
theoretical constraint) would be a metric by which an agent could be evaluated. Clutter 
Avoidance and Logical Closure, on this picture, would be two ideals which need to be 
balanced against each other, rather than mutually inconsistent mandates. 
 Reasons-first epistemology provides another way to accommodate the spirit of 
clutter avoidance and of logical closure norms.30 On such a picture, that forming a belief 
would be taxing on our cognitive resources (or that the subject matter is junk) is a reason 
that militates against forming it and perhaps which favors not opening the question at all. 
That a proposition follows from your beliefs, on the other hand, is reason to believe it. 
Both of these reasons are defeasible and can be outweighed by other reasons.  
 What I discuss here does not exhaust the interesting and underappreciated issues 
around clutter. For one, there is the issue of whether clutter is at bottom a practical 
matter, not an epistemic one, and if it is, to what degree clutter and other practical 
considerations can constrain rational belief. Further, as Friedman rightly notes, there is 
little reason to think that beliefs are the only attitude that can clutter the mind.  
Entertainings, wonderings, suspicions, doubts, and perhaps even hopes or worries can tax 




30 I understand reasons-first epistemology here as presented by Jonathan Dancy (2000; 2018). T. 
M. Scanlon (1998) and John Skorupski (2010) take a similar approach. 
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CHAPTER 2: DISSOLVING THE TENSION BETWEEN THE 
EPISTEMIC AND THE ZETETIC 
 
There has been a great deal of recent discussion of the relationship between 
familiar epistemic norms and the norms that govern inquiry, or zetetic norms.  Jane 
Friedman argues that many norms of contemporary epistemology, like consistency norms 
or evidential norms, will conflict with the norms that govern inquiry.31  This gives rise to 
what David Thorstad calls the reaction question: as theorists of the epistemic, how should 
we respond to this tension?32 We could accept that there is such a tension within the 
epistemic and explain it should not worry us and indeed, is an unavoidable feature of the 
normative landscape, as Thorstad does.  We could radically revise the epistemic norms to 
accommodate the zetetic norms and the prominent role of inquiry in our epistemic lives, 
as Friedman suggests.  Finally, we could eliminate the tension by separating the zetetic 
and the epistemic, say, by denying that zetetic norms are properly epistemic.  Call this 
strategy separationism.  Separationism, at first blush, is an appealing option.  Zetetic 
norms, after all, often recommend actions rather than doxastic attitudes and are sensitive 
to our desires and goals in a way that traditional epistemic norms are not.   
Separationism, however, is not as appealing as it may seem.  I present a puzzle for 
the separationist strategy.    Any way of solving this puzzle, I argue, will eliminate the 
tension between zetetic and epistemic norms that motivated separationism in the first 
place, leaving separationism unmotivated.   In Section 1, I explicate the tension between 
zetetic norms and a number of familiar dynamic epistemic norms.  In Section 2, I present 
a puzzle for separationism.  In Section 3, I survey a number of potential responses to the 
puzzle and explain why my favored solution is preferrable to the others.  In Section 4, I 
argue that any of the plausible solutions to the puzzle will eliminate the tension between 
the zetetic and the epistemic, leaving separationism unmotivated.    
 
31 Jane Friedman, “The Epistemic and the Zetetic,” Philosophical Review, forthcoming. 
32 David Thorstad, “Inquiry and the Epistemic,” Philosophical Studies, 2021. 
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1: Tension Between the Epistemic and the Zetetic 
 
Friedman argues that the zetetic norms are in tension with a number of familiar epistemic 
norms.33  She focuses on the Zetetic Instrumental Principle: 
 
Zetetic Instrumental Principle (ZIP): If one wants to figure out a question Q, 
then one ought to take the necessary means to figuring out Q. 
 
ZIP tells us how to proceed when we want, or need, to know the answer to some question 
– that is, when we inquire.   A few clarifications are in order.  First, we can restrict our 
attention to cases in which the aim of inquiry is not morally reprehensible, like 
investigating someone for purposes of blackmail, or inane, like trying to figure out how 
many blades of grass are growing from a certain stretch of sidewalk.   Second, we’ll 
suppose for now that the inquiries under discussion are important and relatively urgent.  
A more comprehensive account of the norms of inquiry may offer some insight into 
appropriate zetetic goals and inquiries undertaken on a whim or out of mild curiosity.   
However, for the purposes of this paper, we should understand ZIP as a norm concerning 
morally permissible, important, urgent inquiries.  
Many inquiries require sustained concentration.  If I want to know whether I need to 
submit a 198S form on my taxes, I'll need to focus intently on comparing the byzantine 
rules concerning who must submit a 198S with my financial information for at least some 
stretch of time.  Friedman offers the example of trying to figure out how many windows 
the Chrysler Building has.  If I want to find out, I’ll have to avoid distraction long enough 
to finish my count.  Focusing intently on the rules about who submit a 198S or counting 
the windows of the Chrysler building precludes attending to other things or engaging in 
 
33 Friedman, “The Epistemic and the Zetetic.” 
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other activities. If ZIP is right that I should focus on my inquiry, then I ought not engage 
in activities that would derail my inquiry.  We might express this though with the 
following principle: 
 
Incompatible Alternatives (IA): If one ought to Φ at t, and one cannot both φ and ψ 
at t, then one is not permitted to ψ at t. 
 
ZIP, together with Incompatible Alternatives, issues a number of prohibitions. If my aim 
is to figure out how many windows the Chrysler building has, then according to ZIP, I 
ought to focus on counting, at least enough to avoid losing count.  Anything I cannot do 
while focusing on my counting to the required degree is not permissible, by Incompatible 
Alternatives.  It's this feature of ZIP that generates conflict with familiar epistemic norms.  
I’ll first discuss the tension between ZIP and permission-granting norms, then the tension 
with requirement norms.  Consider the following norms: 
 
 Dynamic Evidential Permission (EP): If one has excellent evidence   
 for P at t, then one is permitted to come to believe that P at t. 
 
Dynamic Knowledge Permission (KP): If one is in a position to know that P at t, 
then one is permitted to come to know that P at t. 
 
Each of these norms permits me to believe a wide swath of propositions which I have 
excellent evidence for or am in a position to know.  However, while I'm counting the 
windows on the Chrysler building or working on my taxes, ZIP will rule many of these 
beliefs impermissible.  Perhaps I can come to believe some of these without losing focus, 
but there will inevitably be some belief that EP or KP rule permissible that I cannot form 
without breaking my concentration. 
This does not mean that it's impossible to conform to both ZIP and the dynamic 
permission norms.  When they conflict, an agent can simply decline to believe the 
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proposition that ZIP forbids and EP or KP permits.  We can describe the kind of tension 
we see here as weakly incoheren. Two norms are weakly incoherent iff they jointly imply 
a sentence of the following form: 
 
 (W) One is permitted to φ at t and one is not permitted to φ at t. 
 
 In other words, weakly incoherent norms disagree about the permissibility of 
some action or belief, but they do not (on their own) leave the agent with no permissible 
option.  However, the tension is stronger when we turn to epistemic requirements: 
 
 Dynamic Evidential Requirement (ER): If one has excellent evidence   
  for P at t, then one ought to come to believe that P at t. 
 
Dynamic Knowledge Requirement (KR): If one is in a position to know that P 
at t, then one ought to come to know that P at t. 
 
In cases where successful inquiry requires maintaining focus, and therefore not attending 
to one's evidence or surrounding to form new beliefs, ER and KR will require that one 
form beliefs that ZIP forbids.  We can call this tension strong incoherence.  A set of 
norms is strongly incoherent iff they imply a sentence of the following form: 
 
 (S) One ought to φ at t and one is not permitted to φ at t. 
 
Strongly incoherent norms, unlike weakly incoherent norms, do leave agents with no 
permissible options. If I ought to believe that I've taken more than 30 plane rides in my 
lifetime, because I have excellent evidence for it, but I ought not believe the same 
proposition, because reviewing my evidence would distract me from determining whether 
I need to submit a 198S form. I could, of course, conclude my inquiry about taxes and 
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then come to believe that I've taken more than 30 plane rides, but according to EP, I 
ought to come to believe it right then. 
ZIP, then, generates weak incoherence with dynamic permission norms and strong 
(and weak) incoherence with the dynamic requirement norms. 
 
1. 1 THE SCOPE OF THE TENSION 
 
Friedman's exposition of the tension between the epistemic and the zetetic focuses on 
ZIP, but ZIP is not the only zetetic norm that generates incoherence when combined with 
familiar epistemic norms.  For instance, another class of paradigmatic zetetic norm, 
evidence gathering norms, will face a similar issue.34 A norm that permits an agent to 
gather evidence at a time, supposing evidence gathering sometimes requires 
uninterrupted attention, will generate weak incoherence with dynamic requirement norms 
like ER and DKR.  If an evidence-gathering norm generates requirements, as ZIP does, 
then we will see weak incoherence with the dynamic permission norms, and strong 
incoherence with the dynamic requirement norms.   
Dynamic norms that tell us how to change our beliefs are incoherent with ZIP and 
other zetetic norms. There remains a question about how the static norms, which permit 
or require one to be in a certain state, will interact with the zetetic norms.  The tension in 
this case, if there is one, goes by way of the dynamic norms, since it is forming beliefs, 
not merely having them, that is incompatible with maintaining focus.  As Friedman notes, 
whether the tension extends to static norms will depend on the relationship between the 
static and dynamic norms.  She suggests that we should expect dynamic and static norms 
to "move in lockstep".  The thought here is that requirements to have a belief drive 
 
34 Richard J. Hall and Charles R. Johnson, “The Epistemic Duty to Seek More Evidence,” 
American Philosophical Quarterly 35, no. 2 (1998): 129–39; Elise Woodward and Carolina Flores, 
“Epistemic Vigiliance: In Defense of Epistemic Norms on Evidence-Gathering,” [Manuscript], n.d.; Kelly 
Annesley, “[Manuscript],” n.d. 
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requirements to form that belief and the same goes for permissions.  I argue in Section 3 
that, despite appearances, there is no incoherence between ZIP and familiar dynamic 
norms.    If this is right, then the static norms will not produce incoherence with ZIP 
either. 
 
1.2  RESPONDING TO THE TENSION 
 
There are three ways to respond to the weak and strong incoherence between ZIP and 
more commonplace epistemic norms. The first is to simply accept the tension.  One way 
to do this is to accept that are genuine epistemic dilemmas, that is, cases in which there is 
no permissible option.35   Another is to endorse the focalist view that Thorstad 
advocates.  According to focalism, the tension between the epistemic and the zetetic 
comes from inevitable level tension in our epistemic evaluation.  The second, which 
Friedman endorses, is to radically revise the epistemic to eliminate the tension.  The 
thought is that inquiry is central to our epistemic lives and the epistemic norms we posit 
should accommodate this core feature.  The final option is to cleave the zetetic from the 
epistemic.  The most natural way to do this is by insisting that the zetetic norms are not 
really epistemic, perhaps because they are practical norms that happen to do with ends 
that bear epistemic value. Call this option separationism about the epistemic and the 
zetetic domains. 
Separationism is, I suspect, an attractive response for many.   It allows us to retain 
our favorite epistemic norms without accepting incoherence.  The cost is relegating the 
 
35  Nick Hughes argues at length that epistemic dilemmas not only exist, but are entirely 
commonplace. Nick Hughes, “Who’s Afraid Of Epistemic Dilemmas?,” in Epistemic Dilemmas: New 
Arguments, New Angles, ed. Scott Stapleford, Mathias Steup, and Kevin McCain, forthcoming; Nick 
Hughes, “Epistemic Dilemmas Defended,” in Epistemic Dilemmas, ed. Nick Hughes, forthcoming; Nick 
Hughes, “Dilemmic Epistemology,” Synthese 196, no. 10 (2019): 4059–90, https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-
017-1639-x. 
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norms governing evidence gathering, double checking, expert consultation, and other 
zetetic activities to the practical domain.  Given the sensitivity to our desires, interests, 
and practical constraints that ZIP and norms like it display, perhaps this cost is not so 
high after all.   If we are to pay this cost, however, separationism had better successfully 






2: A Puzzle for the Separationist 
 
There is a further obstacle for the separationist strategy:  the epistemic is strongly 
incoherent on its own, without any zetetic norms gumming up the works.   This is not 
simply to say that the set of norms advocated by various contemporary epistemologists 
are strongly incoherent, though this is no doubt true.  Rather, many dynamic requirement 
norms are strongly incoherent with themselves.  We don't need to have a full accounting 
of the correct epistemic norms to see that a number of them will produce strong 
incoherence. 
Consider the following case.  At time t, I have excellent evidence for P and 
excellent evidence for Q, though I don't yet believe either proposition.  It would take me 
a couple minutes of reflecting on my evidence to come to believe P (in the typical way, 
rather than by taking a pill or sustaining a blow to the head) and likewise for Q.  Because 
of this, I'm not able to come to believe P and come to believe Q at the same time.   That, 
is, coming to believe P and coming to believe Q are incompatible alternatives. 
Because I have excellent evidence for P at t, ER will say that I ought to come to believe 
that P.   By stipulation, I cannot both come to believe P and come to believe Q at t, so by 
the Incompatible Alternatives principle, I am not permitted to come to believe Q at t.  But 
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I have excellent evidence for Q as well, so according to ER I ought to come to believe Q 
at t, as well.  A bit more formally: 
 
 1. The Case: One has excellent evidence for P and excellent evidence for Q.  One 
  cannot both form a belief that P at t and form a belief that Q at t. 
2. Dynamic Evidential Requirement (ER): If one has excellent evidence for P 
at t, then one ought to come to believe that P at t.  
 3. Incompatible Alternatives: If one ought to φ at t, and one cannot both φ  and 
ψ    at t, then one is not permitted to ψ at t. 
 4. One ought to come to believe that P at t (1, 2).  
 5. One is not permitted to come to believe that Q at t. (3, 4) 
 6. One ought to come to believe that Q at t. (1, 2). 
 C. One ought to come to believe that Q at t and one is not permitted to come to 
believe  Q at t. (5, 6) 
 
This argument shows that ER gives rise to strong incoherence.  Recall that a set of 
norms is strongly incoherent if, and only, if they imply a sentence of the form "one ought 
to φ at t and one is not permitted to φ at t.  The conclusion of this argument is such a 
sentence. 
While I've used ER as an example, the phenomenon extends to a number of other 
epistemic requirements.  KR, for instance will also generate strong incoherence alone. 
Inevitably, there will be a number of things that one is in a position to know at any given 
time, but which are not possible to come to know at the same time.  Any dynamic 
requirement norm whose triggering condition can be met with respect to several different 
propositions at the same time will require that we come to believe a proposition while, by 
Incompatible Alternatives, not permitting that we come to believe that proposition.  Even 




 Resolve Inconsistency:  If one has inconsistent beliefs at t, then one ought to 
cease to  believe one of them at t. 
 
It's perfectly possible (indeed, likely) that at any given time, we have a number of 
inconsistencies among the things we believe.  Figuring out how to resolve these 
inconsistencies often takes time, so it's plausible that we're not often able to resolve more 
than one inconsistency at the same time.  Resolve Inconsistency, then will require that we 
resolve a given inconsistency while forbidding, by way of Incompatible Alternatives, that 
we resolve that inconsistency.   I'll discuss which norms face this puzzle in 3.3 and 3.4, 
but it suffices for now to say that a wide range of dynamic requirements will produce this 
issue.  
 This argument presents a puzzle for those who would evict the zetetic from the 
epistemic.   If our rationale for exiling inquiry, an activity central to our epistemic lives, 
from the epistemic was that it would eliminate incoherence from the epistemic domain, it 
should give us pause that we have not successfully done so.   To restore coherence to the 
epistemic, we must reject one of the premises. 
 
3: Responses to the Puzzle 
 
In order to resolve the puzzle presented in the previous section, the separationist 
has three main options: 1) reject the case, 2) reject Incompatible Alternatives, or 3) reject 
ER (and other strongly incoherent norms) as formulated.  I discuss rejecting the case in 
3.1 and rejecting Incompatible Alternatives in 3.2.  The third approach can take a few 
forms.  First, in 3.3, I discuss rejecting ER and the other incoherent norms wholesale. 
Second, I discuss replacing ER and other incoherent norms with more modest norms that 
avoid incoherence in 3.4.  Finally, I consider in 3.5 a way to reformulate ER and affected 
norms in a way that captures the motivation of the norm without running into 




3.1 REJECT THE CASE 
 
The case, as described, is that one has excellent evidence for two propositions, P 
and Q, but one cannot come to believe both of them at the same time.  This may be 
because each would require some reflection and deliberation to arrive at, though no 
particular explanation is essential to the case.  Someone who would deny that our case is 
genuinely possible, then, would have to claim that we can come to believe any two 
propositions for which we have excellent evidence at the same time.  This claim is not 
particularly plausible.  This is not to deny that there are a number of propositions for 
which we have excellent evidence that we can come to believe at the same time.  A belief 
that there are exactly 12 cupcakes in the box and a belief that there aren't 13 cupcakes in 
the box, for instance, can be formed simultaneously, and typically would be.  However, 
there certainly are some excellently supported propositions which one would only come 
to believe after a minute or two of carefully attending to one's evidence and which are 
dissimilar enough that one could not attend to the evidence for each of them at the same 
time. For example, suppose I currently have excellent evidence that I have taken more 
than 30 plane rides in my life.  To come to believe that proposition, I would need a few 
moments to take stock of the various flights I've taken at various points in my life. I also 
have excellent evidence that the car my grandfather had when I was a toddler wasn't a 
Prius.  However, it would take me a moment or two to work out which years he would 
have had the car and recall the Prius was not released until the late-90s, and thereby form 
the belief.  I have excellent evidence for each of these, but I cannot form them at the same 
time because I cannot review the evidence for both at the same time.  This seems like a 
perfectly plausible case. However, to avoid strong incoherence within the epistemic by 
denying the case, one would have to deny that such a case is possible.  This, to me, is a 
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high cost and I’ll argue in the next two sections that rejecting Incompatible Alternatives 
or ER are more promising options. 
 
3.2 REJECT INCOMPATIBLE ALTERNATIVES 
 
The next option we might take to avoid strong incoherence is to reject 
Incompatible Alternatives for belief formation.36 Denying Incompatible Alternatives for 
belief formation amounts to saying that if you ought to φ at t, and you cannot both φ and 
ψ at t, then ψ-ing may well be permissible at t (where φ-ing and ψ-ing are forming some 
belief or other).  If ER is correct, then we will have a vast number of propositions that we 
ought to come to believe, but which we cannot come to believe at the same time. Indeed, 
we cannot come to believe all of the propositions we have excellent evidence for at all, 
let alone at the same time.  If we reject Incompatible Alternatives, it will not be 
impermissible to come to believe any of these propositions (at least not for the reason that 
doing so would be incompatible with believing the others).    
One reason some epistemologists might favor rejecting Incompatible Alternatives 
for belief formation is that it handles requirements to believe that go beyond an agent's 
current abilities rather awkwardly.  So long as there is one proposition that one ought to 
come to believe, Incompatible Alternatives will deliver the result that one is not permitted 
to believe any proposition which one cannot believe.  Call the proposition that one ought 
to believe P and an arbitrary proposition which one cannot believe Q.  One cannot believe 
P and Q at the same time because one cannot believe Q at all.  So, by Incompatible 
Alternatives, one is not permitted to believe Q.   
While it may seem harmless to forbid believing propositions that an agent cannot 
in fact believe, this feature of Incompatible Alternatives is an uneasy fit with the way 
 
36 Note that this is perfectly consistent with maintaining a version of the principle where actions 
are concerned.   
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many epistemologists think of the norms of rationality.  For instance, some think that 
rationality has something to say about which propositions are deserving of belief, even 
beyond the capabilities of human agents.37  On this view, it is extremely odd to say that 
those beliefs are not just out of reach, but rationally impermissible, for human agents.  It 
is one thing to say that rationality does not require more than we are capable of.  It’s quite 
another to say that  believing anything we’re in fact unable to believe is rationally 
impermissible!    
 
3.3 REJECT ER OUTRIGHT 
  
The norms that produce strong incoherence when paired with the Case and 
Incompatible Alternatives are dynamic requirements (though not all dynamic requirement 
are incoherent).  The Case is one in which one cannot form a belief that P and a belief 
that Q at the same time (where one has excellent evidence for P and Q).  The static 
analogue of the Case would be that one cannot both have a belief that P and have a belief 
that Q.  This is wildly implausible.  Whatever difficulty we may have in forming two 
beliefs about different subjects at the same time, it does not extend to merely having 
those beliefs.38   Similarly, permission norms do not generate incoherence on their own, 
as ER does.  This is because strongly incoherent norms declare both that one ought to φ 
and that is not permitted to φ, while weakly incoherent norms say that one is permitted 
and not permitted to φ.  Permission norms do not say what one ought to do, nor do they 
say what is not permissible. 
 
37 Declan Smithies (2015) and David Christensen  (2004) argue for this claim.   
38  This is not to say that a set of static norms cannot be strongly or weakly incoherent.  What I 
mean here is that static norms will not, as ER does, induce incoherence on their own without any other 
norm.  If a static norm is implicated in incoherence (on its own), it will be by way of a bridge principle that 
generates dynamic requirements from static requirements.   
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The observation that it's only dynamic requirements that cause trouble suggests 
several principled ways to do away with ER and other incoherent norms.  The first is to 
endorse a version time-slice rationality and deny that there are dynamic norms in the 
epistemic domain.39  This route has a further advantage.  Friedman suggests that some 
static norms will be in tension with ZIP because they generate dynamic requirements 
which conflict with ZIP.  Because time-slicers deny that static norms generate any kind 
of dynamic norm, their norms will not be in tension with ZIP.  Advocates of time-slice 
rationality can admit zetetic norms as genuinely epistemic without rendering the 
epistemic incoherent, though I expect such a proposal is not to the taste of many of them. 
 Denying that there are epistemic requirements is another principled way to reject 
ER and other incoherent norms.40  Permissions alone will not generate strong or weak 
incoherence.  On this view, however, ZIP will still generate weak incoherence with the 
other epistemic norms, so we would have to either accept weak incoherence or banish the 
zetetic from the epistemic domain.   
Time-slice rationality and denying epistemic requirements both have some 
purchase among contemporary epistemologists (though perhaps the former more than the 
latter).  However, for many, adopting one of these proposals would be just the sort of 
radical revision of the epistemic that we were hoping to avoid by cleaving the zetetic 
from the epistemic.  An approach that retains at least some of the spirit of incoherent 
norms, without reintroducing incoherence, is worth considering. 
 
3.4 RESTRICT ER 
 
 
39 Brian Hedden (2015) articulates time-slice rationality as (in part) the claim that there are only 
static norms that govern our doxastic attitudes.  This leaves open that actions or non-doxastic attitudes like 
hopes might be subject to dynamic norms, though such norms would not be in the spirit of the proposal. 
40 Chase Wrenn (2007) and Mark Nelson (2010) both defend something along these lines, 
although Nelson allows that there may be negative epistemic duties. 
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Our second option is to reject ER and replace it with a more modest evidential 
requirement (and doing the same, mutatis mutandis, for other incoherent norms).  Not just 
any more modest norm will do.  For instance, requiring that one come to believe 
propositions for which they have excellent evidence and which they are interested in 
would not suffice.  I might be interested in and excellent evidence for several 
propositions which I cannot come to believe at the same time.   A more promising 
approach focuses on the agent's recognition or appreciation of their evidence: 
  
Recognized Dynamic Evidential Requirement (RER): If one has excellent 
evidence for P and one recognizes that one has excellent evidence that P at t, then 
one ought to come to believe that P at t. 
 
The thought behind RER is that to generate a requirement to form a belief, one must not 
only have excellent evidence, but recognize that one does.  Why might RER avoid 
incoherence? Recognizing that one has excellent evidence for a proposition will often 
require some amount of attention and consideration of one's evidence.  One cannot attend 
to two very disparate subsets of one's evidence at the same time.  So, if one can recognize 
that one has excellent evidence for P and Q at the same time, there must be substantial 
overlap in one's evidence for P and one's evidence for Q.   If P and Q are sufficiently 
related that one can recognize that one has excellent evidence for P and Q at the same 
time, then one can come to believe P and Q at the same time. Coming to believe P and 
coming to believe Q, then, will not be incompatible alternatives, and so incoherence will 
not arise. 
 This tack is unlikely to be successful.  In the case of RER, one might have 
excellent evidence for P but nonetheless be unable to form the belief because believing 
that P would be uncomfortable or distressing.  We can easily imagine that in such a case, 
one needs to turn P over in one's mind and slowly accustom oneself to the idea.  In short, 
even after recognizing that   If in such a situation, one recognized that one had excellent 
evidence for Q, as well, then coming to believe Q would be required, by RER, yet 
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impermissible by Incompatible Alternatives, because it is incompatible with coming to 
believe P.  So, restricting ER to recognized excellent evidence will not help escape 
incoherence. 
There's reason to think that other more modest dynamic evidential norms will not 
fare better.  We might try to remedy the situation by looking for a norm with a tighter 
connection between its triggering condition and belief formation.  That is, we might look 
for a candidate norm whose triggering condition is so tightly connected to belief that an 
agent who meets the triggering condition cannot fail to form the relevant belief.   It's not 
clear how a norm that cannot be violated puts any real normative pressure on agents.  
And certainly, the epistemic norms that are the bread and butter of contemporary 
epistemology are not so trivially met.  On the other hand, if our candidate norm leaves 
any daylight between its triggering condition and belief formation, then, as with RER, it 
will be incoherent.  All we need is a case in which one meets the triggering condition for 
a proposition P but fails to believe P, then meets the triggering condition for a proposition 
Q that is not possible to come to believe at the same time as P.   The prospects for a more 
modest version of ER, DKR, or other incoherent norms are dim. 
 
3.5 REFORMULATE ER  
 
Another potential route is to reformulate ER to avoid inconsistency. This may 
seem a strange suggestion. I've just argued that even more modest versions of ER will be 
incoherent, so it seems unlikely that a version of the very same norm could.  But ER and 
its more modest counterparts, as formulated, differ in an important respect from similar 
dynamic epistemic requirements as they're typically discussed.  Namely, epistemologists 
typically formulate epistemic requirements timelessly. That is, the norm itself does not 
specify a particular time at which one must comply.   For instance, consider the timeless 
version of ER: 
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Timeless Dynamic Epistemic Requirement (TER): If one has excellent 
evidence for P, then one ought to come to believe that P. 
 
While TER does not make explicit reference to a particular time, there is a sense in which 
TER requires exactly what ER does.  One will come to have excellent evidence for P at a 
time, which we can call t.  TER then, will imply that, at t, one ought to come to believe 
that P.  Is this not exactly what ER says, that one ought to come to believe that P at t?  It 
would seem, then, that there’s little difference between the demands of TER and those of 
its timestamped counterpart.41  
 However, this may be too quick.  It's true, at t, that one ought to come to believe 
that P.  Does it follow from that fact that one ought to come to believe P at t?  Or would 
t+1 do? Suppose that it's perfectly true, right now, that I ought to give part of my income 
to charity.  This leaves open whether I ought to give part of my income to charity right 
now.  Giving part of my income to charity tomorrow, or in a few weeks when I balance 
my budget, would do just as well to meet this obligation, and there may be strong reasons 
not to do so right now. The obligation to give part of my income to charity appears to be 
timeless, in that it does not specify a particular time at which I must comply.   
  We might insist that the timeless obligation is simply a series of timestamped 
obligations, according to which, for each time ti, I ought to give part of my income to 
charity at ti.  However, the difference between the timeless obligation and a collection of 
successive timestamped obligations is not trivial.  When I give part of my income to 
charity two weeks from now, we want to say that I have fully discharged the obligation- 
I'm in good standing as far as my obligation to give to charity is concerned.  However, if 
we have a successive series of timestamped obligations, then while I fulfilled my 
obligation to give to charity at that the time that I did, I have still failed to meet a number 
of my obligations.  It's a serious cost to have to have to say that, after donating part of my 
 
41 I use "timestamped" to refer to a norm or obligation that does specify exactly when it is to be 
met. That is, "timestamped" is just the converse of "timeless". 
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income, I failed to fulfill many of my obligations to donate but I did fulfill one.  It's 
seems clear that there is only the one obligation which is relatively flexible about when 
and how it is fulfilled. 
 If dynamic epistemic requirements are timeless, like TER, then they will require 
that we form certain beliefs, but not specify exactly when we must do so.   Such norms 
will not produce the strong incoherence that their timestamped counterparts do.   Take 
TER as an example.  Suppose I, at t, have excellent evidence for P and for Q.  By TER, I 
ought to come to believe that P and I ought to come to believe that Q, but not necessarily 
at t.  These obligations do not trigger Incompatible Alternatives, because it's not the case 
that I ought to believe P at t, rather than a few moments or hours or even days later. To 
put the point differently, I will not have violated TER if I come to believe that P and then 
come to believe that Q. There is no normative pressure to come to believe both at one 
time, as there is with ER.  Coming to believe that P (at some point) and coming to believe 
that Q (at some point) are not incompatible alternatives at all. 
 The separationist, then, can simply insist that the dynamic requirements are 
timeless in order to avoid the puzzle of the previous section.  In addition to avoiding 
incoherence, positing timeless norms has a number of other advantages.  It allows us to 
say that an agent has fully discharged their obligation when they form the requisite belief.  
With timestamped requirements, on the other hand, we have to maintain in many cases 
that such an agent has still failed to meet most of the relevant requirements because they 
didn't form the belief at each time between when they first met the triggering condition 
and when they did, in fact, form the belief.    This strategy for avoiding incoherence is 
appealing.  We need not reject an everyday case, deny the intuitive Incompatible 
Alternatives, or impose a serious revision on our favored epistemic norms.  In fact, given 
that these norms are most often formulated timelessly,  it may be more in line with the 
norms that philosophers do, in fact, favor. 
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4: Dissolving the Tension 
 
A tempting response to the incoherence between ZIP and other epistemic norms is 
to try to separate the epistemic from the zetetic. However, this separationist strategy faces 
a puzzle: dynamic requirements generate incoherence alone, without taking any other 
norms into account.   Separating the epistemic from the zetetic, then, will be insufficient 
to restore coherence to the epistemic.  If we want to separate the epistemic and the zetetic 
without accepting incoherence or radically revising the epistemic, we'll have to reject one 
of the principles that gave rise to the incoherence. 
I've surveyed the three basic responses to the puzzle: rejecting the case, denying 
Incompatible Alternatives, and denying ER.  The case is highly plausible, so rejecting it 
is not a satisfactory solution to the puzzle.  Rejecting Incompatible Alternatives for 
beliefs is somewhat more promising.  Rejecting ER and other dynamic requirements 
outright suffices to avoid the puzzle at the cost of fairly radical revision.   Restricted 
versions of ER fail to avoid the puzzle.  A more promising solution is to deny ER as 
stated and reformulate it timelessly.  However, solving the puzzle does not necessarily 
vindicate the separationist strategy.  All of the plausible solutions to the puzzle, I’ll argue, 
also dissolve the tension between ZIP and ER that motivated separationism in the first 
place. 
The tension between ZIP and the dynamic epistemic requirements and 
permissions relies on Incompatible Alternatives.  If we reject Incompatible Alternatives, 
ZIP will not deliver the consequence that it’s impermissible to form the beliefs that ER 
requires and EP permits.  In other words, ZIP will no longer be strongly incoherent with 
the dynamic requirements or weakly incoherent with the dynamic permissions.   
However, a milder sort of tension remains.  It is still the case that the dynamic 
requirements and ZIP together put agents in a bind.   If one cannot both Φ and  ψ, but one 
is required to do both, then inevitably, one will fail to do as they ought.   This, however, 
is a more familiar sort of tension: the tension between the demands of epistemic norms 
and our limited capabilities.  While some, of course, think this is reason to revise the 
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epistemic, many, perhaps most, epistemologists are comfortable with the idea that 
rationality will ask more of us than we can deliver. 
Whether rejecting ER dissolves the tension depends on whether we replace it and 
what we replace it with.  A defender of time-slice rationality, who rejects call dynamic 
norms including ER, will face no incoherence between ZIP and the norms he endorses.  
However, he may still have reason to be dissatisfied with ZIP.  While ZIP does not 
require a belief change, it does require temporally extended activities for the purpose of 
belief change.  Whether a time-slicer will want to accept ZIP depends on how we think of 
the commitments of time-slice rationality.   Hedden formulates time-slice rationality as a 
claim about the rational evaluation of attitudes (namely, that it doesn't depend on an 
agent's attitudes at other times).  ZIP doesn't require attitudes at all, and so is not 
inconsistent with the letter of time-slice rationality. It may, however, be in tension with 
the spirit.  Time-slicers would like our evaluation of an agent at a time to be solely a 
function of her doxastic attitudes at that time.  We can determine whether a time-slice of 
an agent meets ZIP, but only by turning our attention away from her doxastic attitudes 
towards the activities she is engaged in.   Another way we might reconcile ZIP with time-
slice rationality is to say that rationality isn't all there is to the epistemic domain– even if 
rationality concerns our attitudes at a given time, other epistemic evaluations, like zetetic 
evaluations, might take more into account. 
Instead of going time-slice, suppose we replace ER with a timeless norm, TER.  
TER does not require that an agent with excellent evidence that P believe P at t, but it 
does require that she believe P.   Supposing P is a proposition which requires some 
deliberation to believe (in the normal way), Incompatible Alternatives and ZIP will say 
that it is impermissible to form a belief that P at t.  While there isn't strong incoherence 
between ZIP and TER as I've defined it, ZIP and TER imply a sentence of the following 
form: 
 
 (T) One ought to φ and one is not permitted to φ at t. 
 
 53 
The question, then, is whether this feature, which we can call temporary incoherence, is 
an unacceptable kind of tension.  Suppose I ought to give part of my income to charity- 
not necessarily at t or any particular time.  I also ought to keep my promise to pick my 
friend up from the airport at t. I can't drive to the airport and donate money at the same 
time, so Incompatible Alternatives will tell us, plausibly, that I am not permitted to give 
money to charity at t.   Is it plausible that I ought to give money to charity and that I am 
not permitted to give money to charity at t?  It's clear to me, at least, that temporary 
incoherence is commonplace and hardly gives us reason to reject either of the temporarily 
incoherent norms.  This is not to say that there's no tension at all, but only that it's not the 
sort of tension that motivates radical revision of the epistemic domain. 
What does all of this mean for the separationist strategy?  The two most 
promising ways to avoid the puzzle for the separationists –rejecting Incompatible 
Alternatives and moving to a timeless dynamic norm – both leave us with no tension, or 
an unproblematic sort of tension, between ZIP and familiar dynamic epistemic norms.  
Any way of solving the puzzle then, strips away the reason to pursue the separationist 
approach in the first place: to eliminate incoherence within the epistemic domain.    
Separationism then fails as a way to preserve coherence within the epistemic.  If we keep 
our time-stamped dynamic requirements and Incompatible Alternatives, the epistemic 
will be incoherent even without ZIP.  If we deal with this incoherence by rejecting 
Incompatible Alternatives or opting for a timeless dynamic norm, then we don't need to 




Separationism seems, at first blush, to be a promising answer to the reaction 
question: how should we, as theorists, respond to the tension between the epistemic?  ZIP 
is, after all, an instrumental norm that is highly sensitive to agents’ desires and goals.   
Relegating it and its ilk to the practical is perhaps not such a steep cost to pay to eliminate 
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incoherence from the epistemic domain.   However, as I argue in Section 2, cleaving the 
zetetic from the epistemic won’t suffice to eliminate incoherence.   This is a puzzle for 
the separationist–the dynamic requirements that are strongly incoherent with ZIP are also 
strongly incoherent alone.  The most promising ways of addressing this puzzle will also 
dissolve the tension between ZIP and the dynamic norms, leaving separationism 
unmotivated. 
Incoherence, however, is not the only reason one might insist that ZIP is not 
epistemic.  For some, the instrumental nature of the norm suffices to make it practical, 
and therefore not epistemic.  This involves denying, contra Friedman, that a norm can be 
both practical and epistemic.   Whether or not this route is appealing, the upshot for 
theorists of the epistemic is interesting.  If we are to separate the epistemic from the 
zetetic, it will be because of our commitment to a particular characterization of the 
epistemic according to which zetetic norms aren't epistemic, not because a conflict 




CHAPTER 3: CAN COMPARATIVISM ABOUT CREDENCE 
DELIVER PROBABILISM? 
 
If I run into a skeptic about precise real-valued credences, one thing I might offer 
her is that surely, she’s more confident in some propositions than others.  If she can order 
propositions according to how confident she is in them, then it’s not too great a jump to 
assigning numbers to them.  These comparative beliefs have an edge on precise, real-
valued credence when it comes to convincing the skeptic.  Unlike precise, real-valued 
credences, we can reliably learn what our comparative beliefs are by introspection and 
comparative beliefs are much less fine-grained.  
We might write off this talk of comparative belief as just a way of motivating 
precise credence.  But we might also understand it as saying something about what 
credences are.  There have been a number of approaches to characterizing credence. 
Some have aimed to explain credences in terms of attitudes that aren’t graded belief:  
preferences or evaluative attitudes.  Others have insisted that credences are 
psychologically real and help explain our actions, preferences, and choices.  I focus in 
this chapter on a third option: comparativism about credences, the view that comparative 
belief, not credences, is psychologically real and primitive.   
Credences, according to comparativism, are simply a tool for representing 
comparative belief. In order to position comparativism as a genuine theory of credence, 
the comparativist has two tasks.  First, he must characterize what credence is on the 
comparativist picture and how it arises from comparative beliefs. Second, he must show 
that probabilism, the dominant theory of rational credence, will still hold on a 
comparativist notion of credence.  This task is somewhat tricky because comparativists 
typically see the norms on comparative belief as normatively fundamental and norms on 
credence as deriving from them.  The comparativist must show that probabilism falls out 
of constraints on rational comparative belief and the comparativist notion of credence. 
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In Section 1, I explain comparativism and the motivations behind it.  In Section 2, 
I present the comparativist argument for probabilism.  In Section 3, I argue that the 
argument fails because it relies on the claim that a rational agent will satisfy the Totality 
condition, which requires that they have a comparative belief about every pair of 
propositions.  In Section 4, I explore the prospects for a comparativist argument for 
probabilism that does not rely on Totality.  I argue that the weaker version of the 
argument fails as well.  In Section 5, I canvas some possible responses to the failure of 
the comparativist argument for probabilism. 
1: Comparativism 
 
Comparativism is the view that comparative belief is (i) psychologically real and 
(ii) a primitive notion in decision theory and epistemology.42  Real-valued credences or 
other numerical degrees of belief, on this view, are merely “a useful fiction”(Stefánsson 
2018, p.1).   This descriptive claim goes along with the normative claim that norms on 
comparative belief, rather than norms on credence, are normatively fundamental.   
To flesh out the comparativist position, it’s useful to contrast it with its 
competitors.  Stefánsson sees comparativism as an alternative to two broad camps in 
interpretations of classical decision theory and the notions of credence and utility which it 
utilizes: behaviorism and mentalism.43  On a behaviorist interpretation, an agent’s 
credence and utility derive from her preferences.  Preferences, in turn, are typically 
reduced to behaviors or behavioral dispositions.  Mentalism, by contrast, takes credences 
 
42 The version of comparativism that I’ll discuss here, sometimes referred to as “primitivist 
comparativism” is defended by H. Orri Stefánsson (2017, 2018).   Lyle Zynda (2000) offers a somewhat 
similar approach, which Stefánsson dubs “pragmatic comparativism.” However, Zynda ultimately sees 
comparative beliefs not as a primitive doxastic attitude, but a tool for interpreting preferences.   
43 See Samir Okasha, “ON THE INTERPRETATION OF DECISION THEORY,” Economics & 
Philosophy 32, no. 3 (November 2016): 409–33, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0266267115000346; Lara 
Buchak, Risk and Rationality (Oxford University Press, 2013). for discussion of these broad classes of 
interpretations of decision theory. 
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(and utilities) to be psychologically real mental entities.  Stefánsson sees comparativism 
as a third option.44  Comparativism rejects the mentalist claim that credences are 
psychologically real.  Unlike the behaviorist, however, comparativists do not reduce 
credence to conative attitudes or outward behavior.   
Stefánsson argues that comparative belief should be taken to be primitive because 
it is indispensable in explaining intentional action. In order to explain why Karl went to 
the bar, to borrow Stefánsson’s example, it’s not enough to know his degree of belief that 
the bar is a good place to make a friend.45  Rather, we need to know that he thinks he’s 
more likely to make a friend at the bar than at the movie theater or at home as he watches 
Netflix.  Indeed, this suggests that comparative belief is necessary for explaining 
intentional action and that numerical degrees of belief can do so only because they 
encode comparative beliefs.46  The explanatory role they play in explaining agent’s 
behavior Stefánsson argues, warrants taking comparative beliefs as a primitive in our 
theory of intentional action.  We have reason to take the primitives of our best theories of 
intentional action to be psychologically real. 
Because it is a primitive, the comparativist will not offer a definition or analysis 
of comparative belief in terms of preference, desire, full belief, or other notions.  
However, we can characterize comparative belief by pointing to how it will typically, but 
not unfailingly, interact with other attitudes.  For instance, comparative belief has a role 
in explaining preferences.  If I am more confident in A than B (that is, I have the relevant 
 
44 While I focus on comparativism about credences here, Stefánsson also favors comparativism 
about utilities, according to which comparative desires, rather than numerical utilities, that are 
psychologically real and fundamental. 
45 We can suppose, for simplicity, that Karl’s sole desire was to make a friend.   
46 Stefánsson argues further that comparative belief (along with comparative desire) is both 
necessary and sufficient for explaining and rationalizing intentional action, while numerical degree of 
belief (and utility) is neither necessary nor sufficient. However, the full argument is not necessary to spell 
out the view.  See Bradley and Stefansson (2016) for an defense of the view that comparative desire (rather 
than should be taken as a primitive notion in our theories of intentional action. 
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comparative belief), then I’ll typically prefer a bet that pays $1 if A over one that pays $1 
if B.  Similarly, should I learn that in fact A is false and B is true, my comparative belief 
that A is more likely than B will explain why I feel surprised (and why my surprise is 
appropriate).   
It’s worth clarifying some of the language that I will use to discuss comparative 
belief. I say that someone ‘compares P and Q’ when she has some comparative belief or 
other about P and Q. I’ll attribute particular comparative beliefs by saying that someone 
‘believes P is more likely than Q’, ‘thinks P is at least as likely as Q’ or ‘is more 
confident in P than in Q’, and variation on these locutions.  It’s important to note, 
however, that this does not imply that that person has a full belief about the content ‘P is 
more likely than Q’.47   
To my knowledge, no comparativist explicitly discusses the relationship between 
comparative belief and full belief.  It seems to me, however, that the comparativist has 
three basic options.  First, he might reduce full belief to comparative belief.  In this case, 
we would expect full beliefs about relative likelihood and comparative beliefs to march in 
lockstep.  Second, he might eliminate full belief entirely.  Finally, he could admit two, 
distinct (though no doubt connected) notions: comparative and full belief. 48   
 
47 Comparativists like Stefánsson and their ilk are typically silent on full belief.  This is some 
indication that, like many of those who focus on credence over full belief, they see full belief as something 
to be reduced to their preferred primitive notion or eliminated entirely.   However, comparativism as stated 
is neutral on whether full belief should be eliminated, reduced to comparative belief, or considered to be a 
wholly distinct doxastic state.   The one possibility that is ruled out by comparativism is that comparative 
belief would be reduced to a full belief, say, that A is more likely than B.  Konek (2019) considers how 
comparative belief might interact with full belief, although unfortunately he does not discuss 
comparativism, the view that comparative belief is a primitive doxastic attitude. 
48 This option may have similar motivations to belief-credence dualism, the view that there are 
full beliefs and credences, and neither reduces to the other.  See Jackson (2020) for an excellent overview 
of the possible views about how full belief and credence relate to one another. 
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In order to better characterize comparative belief, it’s worth engaging in some 
speculation about how the comparativist might distinguish full beliefs about relative 
likelihood and comparative beliefs, should he choose the final option.  Notice that when 
Karl has a comparative belief, he simply has a single attitude towards a pair of 
propositions: that he will find a friend if he goes to the bar and that he will find a friend if 
he goes to the movies.  However, if Karl also has a full belief that he is more likely to 
find a friend in the bar than at the movies, then he has an attitude (full belief) towards a 
content that includes explicit reference to likelihood.  Depending on which notion of 
likelihood appears in Karl’s full belief, he may believe one of a number of things.  
Suppose we impose a frequentist interpretation, so that what Karl believes is something 
like the claim that in the relevant class of similar cases, he’s found a friend more often at 
the bar than at the movies.  Such a full belief may provide some support for a 
comparative belief that he’s more likely to find a friend at the bar than at the movies, but 
it seems clear they are not the same state.  We could imagine Karl having the same full 
belief about relative frequencies in the relevant class of cases, but being struck with a 
bout optimism about finding a friend at the movies, and so having a (perhaps 
unreasonable) comparative belief that he’s more likely to find a friend at the movies than 
the bar.   Similarly, suppose Karl’s full belief is about the objective chance that he’ll find 
a friend at the bar or the movies.  We can imagine him sincerely claiming ignorance of 
the objective chance of his finding a friend each place or even saying that, for all he 
knows, the objective chance of his finding a friend at the movie is higher after all, while 
still having a comparative belief that he’s more likely to find a friend at the bar.  A full 
belief about the relative likelihood of two propositions, where likelihood is interpreted as 
frequency or objective chance, can come apart from the corresponding comparative 
belief. 
However, it’s clear that the attitude of comparative belief is intimately connected 
to probability, in particular to subjective probability.  Suppose that it’s a subjective 
interpretation of “likely” at play in Karl’s full belief that he’s more likely to find a friend 
at the bar than the movies.  Typically, we would cash this out by reference to Karl’s 
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degrees of belief that he’ll find a friend at the bar or that he’ll find a friend at the movies.  
But on a comparativist framework, it’s comparative belief that underwrites degrees of 
belief.  So, our hypothetical comparativist might say that Karl’s full belief will be true 
just in case he has the comparative belief that he’s more likely to find a friend at the bar 
than the movies.  On this picture, what it for P to be subjectively more likely than Q 
(relative to a given agent) is for the agent to have a comparative belief that P is more 
likely than Q.   
 
1.1: MOTIVATIONS FOR COMPARATIVISM 
 
Stefánsson sees comparativism as a way to get the theoretical benefits of credences 
without making arbitrary or otherwise implausible claims about agent’s mental states: 
 
The general motivation underlying Comparativism about belief is the thought that 
there is no reason to accept realism about any particular type of numerical degree of 
belief, since, first, comparative belief can play the role we want numerical degree of 
belief to play, and, second, no possible evidence could justify attributing one type of 
numerical degree of belief rather than another to an agent. (2018, p.2). 
 
The two key claims here are that we have reason to be dissatisfied with credences (and 
other numerical degrees of belief) and that comparativism is a genuine alternative that 
can play the theoretical role in epistemology and decision theory that credences typically 
do.  I’ll discuss each of these claims in turn.   
 Zynda (2000, p.51-54) argues that probability functions are but one of a number 
of non-equivalent ways of numerically representing degrees of beliefs.  For instance, 
believability functions map each proposition to a real number between 1 and 10, which is 
its believability.  Believability differs from probability in more than just its scaling 
convention. Unlike probability functions, a believability function is not additive.  Instead, 
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it is sub-additive: when , where B(X) is the 
believability of X.  The upshot is that there are at least two coherent but incompatible 
numerical representations of degrees of belief.49 
 The question, then, is why we should attribute credences, rather than 
believabilities, to agents.   Stefánsson suggests there is no fact about the agent that would 
justify saying that her degrees of belief are really on a scale from 0 to 1 rather than 1 to 
10.  Instead, all we can say is that she her degree of belief is .5 relative to a 0-to-1 scale 
but 5.5 relative to a 1-10 scale.   His conclusion is that numerical degrees of belief, be 
they credences or believabilities, are not psychologically real.  The sense in which they 
are real is that they encode information about something that is psychologically real.  The 
features that are preserved between believability and credence representations of an 
agent’s degrees of belief are the comparative facts. 
 Beyond worries about the incompatible systems for numerically representing 
degrees of belief, taking comparative belief, rather than precise, real-valued credence, to 
be psychologically real can assuage many of the worries that cause some to balk at 
credence talk.  For one, we can discover quite a lot about our comparative beliefs by 
introspection.  By contrast, we cannot typically learn what our precise, real-valued 
credences are by introspection.  Of course, introspection is not a perfect guide to 
comparative beliefs or to credence.  If we think credence is determined by dispositions to 
bet, or to evaluate bets as fair, or even to reason in certain ways, then we should expect 
our exact degree of belief to often be opaque to us.  However, the fact that we can almost 
never discover our precise, real-valued credences by introspection should give us pause.  
 A related worry is that precise, real-valued credences are unrealistically precise.  
What fact about me would justify attributing to me a .9987 credence, rather than a .9986 
 
49 One might worry that having believabilities rather than credences is incompatible with practical 
rationality.  If we imagine one’s preferences as resulting from degrees of belief and utilities by an expected 
value maximization rule, then an agent with believabilities will have incoherent preferences.  However, 
Zynda argues that an agent with believabilities can still have coherent preferences, but her preferences will 
arise from her believabilities and utilities by a maximizing the “valuation” of various actions or options.    
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credence, that prickly pears are native to Texas?  Attributing one credence rather than a 
very similar one, the thought goes, seems to suppose that I have very fine-grained 
doxastic states. 
A second further worry along these lines is that having precise credences goes 
beyond our evidence.  Our evidence is often sparse, vague, and imprecise.  Evidence like 
that doesn’t support a particular precise credence, but rather a more imprecise or coarse-
grained attitude.50  On this view, having precise credences is not just unrealistic, it’s 
rationally subpar.   
A final worry, and a particularly salient one in discussion of comparativism, is 
that a precise credence function (even an improbabilistic one) represents us as being 
much more committal than we in fact are.    If I have a credence in P and one in Q, then 
according to my credence function, I am more confident that P than that Q, more 
confident that Q than that P, or equally confident in each.  This is an artifact of numerical 
representation–numbers are all comparable.   However, it seems an ordinary human agent 
will not be so opinionated.  For instance, I am very confident that escarpment live oaks 
are native to Texas and that Cora is a good dog. In fact, I fully believe each.  But I cannot 
tell you which I am more confident, or whether I’m equally confident in both.51  Insofar 
as normal human agents lack such comparative attitudes, then credences represent them 
as having more opinions than they do.  
There’s at least some reason, then, to be dissatisfied with taking precise, real-
valued credences to be psychologically real.  But if there are no genuine alternatives that 
can play the role that credence does in our theories, then perhaps we need to accept or 
explain away these concerns.  Stefánsson, however, claims that comparative belief can do 
 
50 See Joyce (2005) and Sturgeon (2008). 
51 Of course, my failure to introspect a comparative judgment does not settle the question about 
whether I in fact compare these two propositions.  Still, it seems plausible that in at least some cases, I 
cannot find a comparative belief about P and Q by introspection because I genuinely don’t compare P and 
Q. 
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everything that credences do.  That is, it can explain intentional action and it can play the 
same (or a similar) role in probabilism and decision theory.    
   
1.2: CREDENCES, COMPARATIVISM, AND PROBABILISM 
 
One might wonder why the comparativist is interested in a numerical 
representation of comparative belief at all.   After all, we can perfectly well discuss an 
agent’s comparative beliefs and which comparative beliefs they ought to have without 
resorting to credence talk at all.   We’ve seen in the case of Karl’s trip to the bar that 
comparative belief can explain intentional action without reference to numerical degrees 
of belief.   However, if comparativism is to be a genuine alternative, the comparativist 
must show that comparative belief can play the role that credence does in classical 
decision theory and probabilism. 
Of course, the comparativist could claim that we ought to abandon any decision 
theory or epistemic norms that rely on the mistaken premise that agents have credences.  
However, classical decision theory has been enormously productive and there are a host 
of arguments for probabilism.  With this in mind, the comparativist had better leave 
probabilism and decision theory intact or, failing that, explain away their appeal. 
Stefánsson’s answer to the question of whether comparative belief can do 
everything that credence does in decision theory and probabilism is yes. The reason is 
that comparativism can deliver credences. Credences, in the comparativist sense, are 
merely a tool for representing comparative beliefs.  However, if credences can usefully 
and accurately represent comparative beliefs, then the comparativist can bring decision 
theory and probabilism on board. 
 The remainder of this paper will ask whether comparativism can vindicate 
probabilism. The comparativist strategy makes use of a representation theorem which 
shows that comparative beliefs that meet certain conditions will be representable by a 
probability function.  If those conditions are constraints on rational comparative beliefs, 
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then any rational agent's comparative beliefs will be representable by a probability 
function. That is, probabilism will be true.    
 
2: The Comparativist Argument for Probabilism 
 
The comparativist argument for probabilism uses a representation theorem that shows 
that if one’s comparative beliefs meet certain conditions, then they can be represented as 
a probability function.    In 2.1, I briefly overview the result that appears in the 
comparativist argument for probabilism.  In 2.2, I give the argument and contrast it with 
similar arguments for probabilism based on the decision-theoretic representation theorem.  
In 2.3, I motivate crucial premise of the argument by articulating what is required for 
credence to play the theoretical role that the comparativist sets out for it. 
 
2.1: COMPARATIVE BELIEF REPRESENTATION THEOREMS 
 
Scott (1964) proves that a set of comparative beliefs that meets certain conditions 
will be probabilistically representable.  Call  the set of possible worlds (or basic 
possibilities), and  a Boolean algebra on .  The elements of  will be subsets of , 
which I’ll refer to as propositions. Call  the comparative belief relation, which holds 
between two propositions.  A comparative belief relation  over Ω is fully 




The most straightforward presentation of Scott’s theorem relies on the notion of a 
balanced pair of sequences of propositions.  A pair of sequences of propositions 
 and  is balanced just in case, at each possible world , the 
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cardinality of  is equal to the cardinality of . In less formal terms, a 
balanced pair of sequences of propositions will contain the same number of truths at each 
possible world. We can think of  as a way of counting the truths in the sequence 
 at a given possible world .  To make this more concrete, consider the 





1 will be an element of , because  is  which is true at (and 
therefore has  as an element).  2 will not be an element of  as well, 
because  is  which is not true at .   will be {1} and have a 
cardinality of 1.  In the same way, we can find that the cardinality of , which 
counts the truths in  at , is 1 and the cardinality of  is 1.   In other words, at 
each possible world, exactly one proposition from  is true. Consider the following two 





X and Y are balanced because the cardinality of  is equal to the 
cardinality of of  at each possible world in S.   X and Z, however, are not 
balanced.  The cardinality of  is 1 while the cardinality of  is 2.  
That is, the number of truths in Y and Z differs at . With the notion of a balanced pair of 
sequences of propositions in hand, we can turn to Scott’s representation theorem. 
Scott (1964) proves the following theorem: 
 
A comparative belief relation  over Ω is fully probabilistically representable by some 
probability function p if, and only if,  satisfies the following axioms: 
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1. Non-Triviality:  
2. Non-Negativity:  
3. Totality:  
4. Isovalence: For all balanced pairs of sequences of propositions  
and , if  for all , then for all , as well.52 
 
 
Non-triviality says that the entire state space is at least as likely as the 
contradiction (that is, the empty set).   Non-negativity says that every proposition is at 
least as likely as the contradiction.  Totality says that any two propositions X and Y, 
either X is at least as likely as Y or Y is at least as likely as X (or both).  Isovalence says 
that for any two balanced sequences of propositions, if each  is at least as likely as each 
, then  is at least as likely as .  That is,  and  are equally likely.  The thought is 
that if the two sequences of propositions contain the same number of truths, no matter 
which world is the actual world, and each  is at least as likely as each , then each  
and  should be equally likely. 
Any agent whose comparative belief relation that meets Non-Negativity, Non-
Triviality, Totality, and Isovalence will be fully probabilistically representable by some 
unique probability function.53  However, this alone does not get us probabilism.  
 
 
52This presentation is largely adapted from Konek (2019), but I recast Isovalence in terms of 
balanced sequences of propositions, a notion I borrow  from Harrison-Trainor, Holliday, and Icard (2016).     
I suppress one formal detail here; it’s the comparative belief structure, a triple of S, Ω, and the comparative 
belief relation  that is probabilistically representable.  However, we’re holding S and Ω fixed for present 
purposes, so this won’t make a difference. 
53 Strictly, Scott’s theorem shows that a comparative belief relation will be unique up to a positive 
affine transformation. 
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2.2: THE ARGUMENT FOR PROBABILISM 
There are two gaps we must fill to leverage the representation theorem for an 
argument for probabilism.  First, probabilism requires that a rational agent’s credences be 
probabilistic.  The representation theorem shows that agents that meet the axioms will be 
probabilistically representable.   So, we need to claim that any rational agent will satisfy 
the axioms.   
 Second, there is a gap between an agent’s being representable by some 
probability function and her actually having probabilistic credences.  What we need then, 
is a premise connecting probabilistic representability with the agent’s actual credences. 
 
1. Any rational agent's comparative belief relation ≥ meets Non-Negativity, Non-
Triviality, Totality, and Isovalence. 
2. Representation Theorem: If the agent's comparative belief relation meets Non-
Negativity, Non-Triviality, Totality, and Isovalence, then it is fully representable 
by some probability function p. 
3. If an agent's comparative beliefs relation is fully representable by some 
probability function p, then p is her credence function. 
C. Probabilism: Any rational agent has probabilistic credences.   
 
 Premise 1 says that each axiom of the representation theorem is a constraint on 
rational comparative belief.  Premise 3 says, in effect, that the probability function picked 
out by the representation theorem is actually the agent in question’s credence function.   
 The gap between representability and reality is much discussed the literature on the 
decision-theoretic representation theorem.54  The decision-theoretic representation 
theorem shows that if an agent’s preferences meet certain conditions, then her 
preferences can be represented as resulting from a utility function and probabilistic 
 
54 See Christensen (2001), Eriksson and Hájek (2007) and Meacham and Weisberg (2011) for 
discussion of the analogous issue concerning the decision-theoretic representation theorem. 
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credences.  The question, then, is whether the probability and utility function that the 
decision-theoretic representation theorem picks out agrees with the independent facts 
about the agent’s credences and desires.  That is, the question is whether the 
representation is accurate.   
 By contrast, the comparativist’s task is easy.  According to comparativism, credences 
are useful fiction–a tool for representing comparative beliefs. There are no comparative-
belief-independent facts about an agent’s credences that a probabilistic representation 
could fail to capture.  Whether a probability function (or an improbabilistic credence 
function) is an agent’s credence function is a matter of whether it represents her 
comparative beliefs sufficiently well. Whether premise 3 is true, then, depends on 
whether full probabilistic representation is enough to play the role that the comparativist 
has carved out for credence. 
 
2.3: REPRESENTING COMPARATIVE BELIEFS 
 
Representations are adequate only with respect to a given goal.  Consider a 
topographical map and a road map.  For a postal worker delivering mail in a new section 
of the city, the road map will give her all the information she needs, while the 
topographical map will be thoroughly useless.   A city planner trying to figure out where 
to place new storm drains and sewer lines, on the other hand, will find the topographical 
map indispensable.  The road map adequately represents the city with respect to the 
postal worker’s goal of navigating the city, but not with respect to the city planner’s goal. 
 The goal of representing comparative beliefs with credence functions is to 
evaluate them epistemically and to predict and explain the actions they motivate.55  If we 
 
55 Epistemic evaluation is slightly too general.  We want to evaluate the structural features that 
comparative belief relations share with probability functions: P is more likely than Q, P is equally likely as 
Q, or P is less likely than Q, etc. all.  We are not trying to evaluate whether the comparative beliefs were 
responsibly or virtuously formed.   
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want to know whether the probability function picked out by the representation theorem 
is a sufficiently good representation of the agent’s comparative beliefs, then we have to 
answer two questions. First, what is required to represent some object well with respect to 
some task?  Second, does a probability function that fully represents a set of comparative 
beliefs represent them well?   
Two features seem indispensable to representing something well with respect to a 
given goal.  First, the representation should be thorough, in the sense that it captures all 
of the relevant sort of feature.  The postal worker navigating a new route will find a 
topographical map or an out-of-date road map inadequate, because both of these maps 
fail to include the sort of feature that is relevant to her goal: roads, their names, and their 
location relative to one another.   Of course, a representation can be more or less 
thorough.  An out-of-date road map might miss only a handful of small streets or a 
freeway exit here or there. The topographical map, on the other hand, will miss almost all 
of the features that she needs to carry out her task. 
 A second feature that a good representation has is faithfulness, in the sense that it 
does not represent the object as having features (of the relevant sort) that it does not in 
fact have.  Consider a more fanciful map, perhaps stolen off a city planner’s desk, which 
includes a number of roads that don’t currently exist, in addition to all of the roads that 
do.  This, too, will frustrate the postal worker as she tries to use it to navigate.  Routes 
that seemed possible will fail to materialize and leave her scrambling to find her 
destination.  
 It’s important to clarify here that almost all representations will include some 
features that do not correspond to features of the represented object. This is not a bad 
thing.  For instance, a political map of the world might show Argentina in pink, Brazil in 
yellow, and Uruguay in purple, although these colors don’t correspond to any actual 
feature of the world.  The colors of countries on a world political map are 
representational artifacts–features of the representation that do not correspond to actual 
features of the represented object.  The important thing is that a representation be 
thorough and faithful with respect to the feature that are relevant to the goal at hand.  A 
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map can be perfectly good for the postal worker’s purposes if it fails to include storm 
drains and fire stations or if it includes some non-road representational artifacts, like the 
colors of various features. 
The relevant features for epistemically evaluating comparative beliefs are 
comparative-belief facts.  So, a perfect representation for our purposes will capture all of 
the agent’s comparative beliefs and not represent the agent as having comparative beliefs 
that she does not have. 
The question we began with was whether the probability function picked out by 
the representation theorem represents the relevant agent’s comparative beliefs sufficiently 
well to count as her credences.  Recall that an agent who meets the axioms will have fully 





We can see that a probability function that agrees with an agent’s comparative 
beliefs in this sense will be thorough–whenever , the probability function reflects 
that fact.  Similarly, it’s clear that the probability function that the representation theorem 
picks out will be faithful.  Any comparative fact that appears in the probability function 
will also appear in the agent’s comparative beliefs.  Strong representability, then, suffices 
for good representation of comparative beliefs with the goal of epistemic evaluation.  A 
credence function that strongly represents a set of comparative beliefs can play the 
theoretical role that the comparativist sets out for credence.  This means that Premise 3 of 
the comparativist argument for probabilism is true.   However, I argue in the next section, 
that the argument is unsound because Premise 1 is false. 
 
3: The Totality Condition 
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Premise 1 of the comparativist argument for probabilism says any rational agent 
will meet the axioms of the representation theorem– Non-Negativity, Non-Triviality, 
Totality, and Isovalence.  I argue in this section that a rational agent need not meet 
Totality.   The Totality axiom says that the agent compares each pair of propositions, in 
the sense that she has a comparative belief about them.  If Totality is a rational 
requirement, then any rational agent will compare every pair of propositions.  In this 
section, I canvas two arguments in favor of thinking that rational agents will satisfy 
Totality and argue that they are not persuasive.  Then, I present reasons to think that 
Totality is not a rational requirement, and therefore that comparativist argument for 
probabilism presented in the previous section fails.   
 
3.1: ARGUMENTS FOR TOTALITY 
 
Cian Dorr, Jake Nebel, and Jake Zuehl (ms.) argue for a comparability principle 
for gradable adjectives like “tall,” “probable,” or “valuable”.56  They further claim that 
this comparability principle, with a few plausible assumptions, entails the striking 
conclusion that all agents have precise credences in every propositions which they are 
confident to any degree (forthcoming).57  It stands to reason, then, that the comparability 
principle may provide some support for the claim that rational agents will satisfy Totality.  
 
56 They also claim that comparatiblity holds for certain adverbs and gradable adjectives that take 
an internal argument like “fond (of x)”.   
57 It might seem that this conclusion should suffice to motivate the claim that rational agents will meet 
Totality. If agents have precise credences, and these credences fully represent their comparative beliefs, 
then they must have complete comparative beliefs as well.  However, there are two obstacles to this line of 
reasoning.  First, it’s possible that there are propositions that an agent is not confident in to any degree. 
(That is, they have no degree of confidence about the proposition, not that they have an extremely low 
degree of confidence.)  So, their claim does not quite suffice to get us complete comparative beliefs.  
Second, as I’ll discuss in the next section, there are several notions of credence that the comparativist can 
draw on that fall short of full representability.  According to some of these weaker notions, an agent might 
have complete credences, but nonetheless have incomplete comparative beliefs.   
 
 72 
Although Dorr, Nebel, and Zuehl do not discuss comparative belief directly, I’ll attempt 
to fill in an argument from their comparability principle to the claim that rational agents 
will satisfy Totality.  The principle they discuss is: 
 
Comparability: If x is at least as F as x and y is at least as F as y, then either x is 
at least as F as y or y is at least as F as x.  
 
The antecedent of this principle may look rather odd.  The idea is to address values for x 
and y to which the graded adjective in question does not apply to any degree.  So, if we 
think that sentences like “magenta is as tall as Tuesday” will be false, then so too will 
“magenta is as tall as magenta”.58  Comparability will be trivially true in these cases.  
For our application, we can assume that x and y will be propositions–subsets of S– and 
that any rational agent will believe  .  With these assumptions we can work with a 
simplified version of Comparability: 
 
Simplified Comparability: Either x is at least as F as y or y is at least as F as x.  
 
 While there may be concerns about whether Comparability is true, I’ll grant both 
Comparability and Simplified Comparability (with our simplifying assumptions).  
Instead, I’ll argue that they’re insufficient to show that any rational agent will meet 
Totality. Recall that an agent meets Totality if they have a comparative belief that  
or that  for each X and Y in S.   Comparative belief itself is an attitude, not a 
gradable adjective.  However, it is closely connected with subjective likelihood and 
“likely” is a gradable adjective.  The strategy for arguing from Simplified Comparability 
to the claim that rational agents meet Totality, then, is to leverage comparability for 
“likely”.  
 
58 Dorr et al. do not claim that such sentences will be false.  Nonetheless, they want to claim only 
that the consequent of Comparability will be true of things that are F to some degree.   
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Subjective Likelihood Comparability: Either X is at least as likely as Y or Y is 
at least as likely as X.  
 
 If Subjective Likelihood Comparability is right, and an agent has a comparative 
belief that P at least as likely as Q just in case P is at least as subjectively likely as Q, then 
every agent will have complete comparative beliefs.   This is a strong conclusion.  The 
claim here is not that any rational agent will have complete comparative beliefs.  Rather, 
the conclusion is that all agents, even the wildly irrational, do in fact have complete 
comparative beliefs.  
 While Subjective Likelihood Comparability looks like an instance of 
Comparability, understood correctly, it is not.   I’ll argue that we can accept 
Comparability and still reject Subjective Likelihood Comparability.  
 “Likely”, on its face, looks like any other gradable adjective, like “tall” or 
“heavy”. But when we are considering subjective likelihood, there is an implicit reference 
to an agent.  A proposition is subjectively likely to a given agent.  What we mean when 
we say that P is at least as subjectively likely than Q is that the agent in question finds P 
to be at least as subjectively likely as Q.  Subjective Likelihood Comparability, then, is 
elliptical for something like the following: 
 
Either A finds X at least as likely as Y or A finds Y at least as likely as X.  
 
This is not a consequence of Simplified Comparability.  To see this, consider an easy and 
plausible instance of Simplified Comparability: either X is at least as tall as Y or Y is at 
least as tall as X (assuming X and Y are at least as tall as themselves).   This seems 
undeniable.  It doesn’t however, imply that Hannah believes that X is at least as tall as Y 
or believes that Y is at least as tall as X.  Nor does it imply that they suspect or hope that 
X is at least as tall as Y, or vice versa.  That is, the comparability of tallness doesn’t tell 
us anything at all about Hannah’s attitudes about the relative tallness of two individuals.   
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 Finding X to be at least as likely as Y is an attitude that an agent can have.  The 
comparability of gradable adjectives does not, on its own, tell us much about the attitudes 
that an agent takes towards them.  If I’m correct that subjective likelihood claims are 
really telling us about an agent’s attitudes, then Subjective Likelihood Comparability 
does not follow from Simplified Comparability at all.   Comparability, then, does not give 
us reason to suppose that rational agents will meet Totality. 
 
Another reason to think that comparative beliefs should be complete is that having 
incomplete comparative beliefs might be practically irrational.  For instance, suppose I 
fail to compare “Cora is a good dog” and “it’s raining outside right now”.  Suppose I am 
offered a bet that pays out $1 if Cora is a good dog or a bet that pays out $1 if it’s raining 
outside.  I would have no preference between them or, at most, a preference that cannot 
be rationalized by my comparative beliefs.  Supposing I should only take an option if I 
believe it has a higher expected value than the alternatives, I should decline to take either 
bet.  This is practically irrational- each bet has positive expected value, so I would be 
better off choosing either one than declining to choose. 
Setting aside concerns about the relationship between practical and epistemic 
rationality, this argument does not cut much ice.  If I have no idea which bet is more 
likely to pay out and their payoffs are equal, then there is no fact of the matter about 
which bet has the highest expected value from my perspective.   It is clear, however, that 
each bet has a higher expected value than refusing to bet (assuming I have some 
confidence in each proposition), which has an expected value of $0.  This suggests that 
the problem lies with the normative supposition that I should only choose an option that 
has higher expected value than the alternatives, rather than with my comparative beliefs.  
It’s true that expected value won’t settle the question of which I should choose, but it 




3.2: ARGUMENTS AGAINST TOTALITY 
 
Beyond the lack of compelling arguments for the claim that a rational agent will 
meet Totality, there are a number of further reasons to doubt the claim.   A preliminary 
reason is the bare intuition that there are pairs of propositions which an agent would not 
be rationally better off for comparing.    For instance, I fail to compare “Cora is a good 
dog” and “it’s raining right now”. I have a great deal of confidence in each of these 
propositions, but I cannot say which I consider more likely, or whether they are equally 
likely.   Of course, introspection may not be a perfect guide to which comparative beliefs 
I have or lack.  However, it’s plausible that in at least some cases in which I cannot find a 
comparative belief by introspection, I in fact don’t have a comparative belief.  The 
question, then, is whether I would be better off, epistemically speaking, for comparing 
“Cora is a good dog” and “it’s raining right now” or “I would enjoy being a florist” and 
“the first person to enter the post office in Austin, Texas on July 10, 1924 was taller than 
5’5””.   It does not seem to me that I would.  
 A more principled reason to doubt that rational agents will have complete 
comparative beliefs is that many such comparative beliefs would unsupported by their 
evidence.  In such cases, to form a comparative belief is to make a baseless guess, 
something rational agents ought not do.  
 Because comparative belief is a primitive, according to comparativism, it is 
somewhat tricky to characterize what constitutes sufficient evidence for a comparative 
belief.    A comparative belief is not simply a full belief that X is more likely than Y.  
Nor, on the comparativist picture, is it the state of having a higher credence in X than in 
Y.  We have well developed theories of what would justify being in either of those states, 
but it’s not obvious to what degree these extend to comparative belief.  I’ll assume going 
forward that sufficient evidence for a full belief that X is more likely than Y is sufficient 
evidence for the corresponding comparative belief.  
 Our question is whether a rational agent will have sufficient evidence for a 
comparative belief about any two propositions whatsoever.   Consider the following case.  
 76 
Bob tells me that he will probably go to the party tomorrow.  Mary tells me that it’s 
pretty likely that she’ll go. Their testimony about their plans is the only evidence I have 
about whether they’ll be at the party.  If Totality is a rational requirement, then I ought to 
believe that it’s at least as likely that Mary will go to the party as that Bob will, that it’s at 
least as likely that Bob will go as that Mary will, or both, if I think they’re equally likely 
to go.  Is either of these supported by my evidence? 
 I would certainly be justified in saying that it is roughly as likely that Bob will go 
to the party as that Mary will.  Being roughly equally likely, however, is consistent with 
one being (strictly) more likely than the other or with their being equally likely.  
Something a great deal more precise would be required to support the claim that one was 
at least as likely as the other and therefore not even a hair less likely.  My evidence in this 
case, however, is too coarse-grained to support such a claim.  Natural language likelihood 
terms, like “probably” and “pretty likely”, are notoriously hard to pin down to even rough 
ranges of probabilities.59  It’s not unlikely that Bob and Mary themselves didn’t have 
anything much more precise than “probably” and “pretty likely”, respectively, in mind.  
That is, it’s plausible that, even on reflection, they would not have been able to produce, 
say, a precise probability that they would go to the party. 
 The relatively course-grained evidence I have does not support the kind of fine-
grained judgement required to say that it’s at least as likely that Mary will go to the party 
as that Bob will (or vice versa).   Given my evidence, it is open to me that it’s a hair more 
likely that Bob will, or a hair more likely that Mary will.   This does not seem to be a 
rational failing–in fact, it seems to be just what my evidence would dictate.   If this is 
right, then a rational agent need not have complete comparative beliefs and therefore 
Premise 1 of the comparativist argument for probabilism is false. 
 
 
59 Track down Mandel & Irwin citation. 
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4: Representability without Totality 
 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, there has been a push to abandon Totality in favor of 
representation theorems that show that incomplete comparative beliefs can be represented 
by probability function in some sense weaker than full representability.60  In this section, 
I consider the weaker forms of probabilistic representability that we get without Totality 
and the version of the argument for probabilism that results.  I argue that this version fails 
as well, though for a different reason. 
 
4.1: Strong Representability 
 
Totality is necessary for full probabilistic representability. That is, it’s necessary for 










 Strong representability requires that one’s credence function preserve the 
structure of one’s comparative beliefs.  That is, if one has the comparative belief that 
P Q, then that fact must be reflected in one’s credences.  But the converse is not 
required, as it is for full probabilistic representability.   Not every comparative fact about 
 
60 See Ríos Insua (1992) and Alon and Lehrer (2014).  Konek (2019) provides an overview of 
varieties of representability and the axioms required to guarantee them. 
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one’s credences need represent an actual comparative belief.   If an agent has incomplete 
comparative beliefs, then there will be multiple probability functions that strongly 
represent her comparative beliefs.61  
 
While full probabilistic representability requires Totality, strong probabilistic 
representability does not.62 A comparative belief structure is strongly representable just 
in case it meets the following conditions: 
 
1. Non-triviality:  
2. Non-negativity:  
3. Isovalence: If  and  for all , then 
 for all , as well.63 
 
These are the same conditions, save for Totality, that are required for full 
probabilistic representation. In order to vindicate probabilism, the comparativist still must 
argue that Isovalence, Non-triviality, and Non-negativity are conditions on rational 
comparative belief.  But they need not make the implausible claim that Totality is as well.   
 
4.2: A REVISED COMPARATIVIST ARGUMENT FOR PROBABILISM 
 
 
61 However, this is not to say that her comparative beliefs is strongly represented only by a set of 
probability functions.  Rather, each individual function strongly represents her comparative beliefs. 
62 There are other forms of representability that are weaker than strong representability: almost 
representability and partial representability.  The worries I raise about strong representability will extend to 
these as well. 
63 Once again, this formulation of Scott’s theorem (1964) is due to Jason Konek (2019). 
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With this new representation theorem in hand, we can formulate a weaker version of the 
Comparativist argument for probabilism: 
 
1. Any rational agent's comparative belief relation ≥ meets Non-Negativity, Non-
Triviality, and Isovalence. 
2. Representation Theorem: If the agent's comparative belief relation meets Non-
Negativity, Non-Triviality, and Isovalence, then it is fully representable by some 
probability function p. 
3. If an agent's comparative beliefs relation is strongly representable by some 
probability function p, then p is her credence function. 
D. Probabilism: Any rational agent has probabilistic credences.   
 
This version of the argument does away with the implausible claim that rational agents 
will have complete comparative beliefs.  This version of Premise 1 is a great deal more 
plausible.64 However, strong representability is a weaker standard than full 
representability.  I argued in Section 2.3 that full representability ensures that a credence 
function will represent an agent’s comparative beliefs well enough to play the role the 
comparativist needs it to: a useful tool for representing comparative belief.  In other 
words, Premise 3 of the original argument for probabilism is true. 
 Strong representability, on the other hand, is too weak to motivate Premise 3 of 
the revised argument.  A probability function that only strongly represents an agent with 
incomplete comparative beliefs will represent her as having comparative beliefs that she 
does not in fact have.  For instance, imagine two agents, Alice and Burt. Each of their 
comparative beliefs meet Non-triviality, Non-negativity, and Isovalence. Alice does not 
compare P and PvQ, but Burt does.  Burt thinks PvQ is at least as likely as P.    Burt’s 
credences (in the sense of strong representability) will have p(PvQ)≥p(P).  Alice’s will as 
 
64 Some worries may remain about why a rational agent would meet Isovalence.  I won’t address 
these here, but refer the reader to Konek (2019, find page) for a discussion of Isovalence. 
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well, despite the fact that she has no opinion on the matter.  This comparative   fact about 
Alice’s credences is a mere representational artifact. 
One might argue that a representation need not be perfect to be useful or to be 
sufficiently accurate to epistemically evaluate the agent in question.  Some features of  
excellent and useful representations have representational artifacts. However, the failure 
in Alice’s case is not so innocuous.  First, the features that the credence function misses 
might be normatively important features.  For instance, Alice fails to compare P and PvQ.  
But it’s plausible that she ought to, and specifically, she ought to believe as Burt does that 
PvQ is at least as likely as P.   One goal of representing an agent’s comparative beliefs is 
epistemic evaluation.  If a representation misrepresents the very features we want to 
evaluate, then it is not adequate for the task.   
A similar issue arises when we look at another goal of representing comparative 
belief: predicting and explaining intentional action.  Suppose Burt is offered a choice 
between $1 if A or $1 if B.  Burt’s credences have p(A)≥p(B), but this is a mere artifact.  
In fact, Burt does not compare A and B at all.   We would predict based on Burt’s 
credences that he would choose $1 if A.  But this prediction would not be based on any 
real fact about Burt’s doxastic states.  If we look at his comparative beliefs, we should be 
unsure which he would choose or perhaps expect that he would choose arbitrarily.   
Further, it’s impossible to tell by looking at a credence function which 
comparative facts are representational artifacts and which genuinely represent a feature of 
the agent’s comparative beliefs.   That p(PvQ)≥p(P) in Alice’s credences is a mere 
representational artifact–there is no such comparative belief.  But other features of the 
same sort do represent features of Alice’s comparative beliefs- for instance p(Ω)≥p( ) 
represents a comparative belief that Alice actually has.  Similarly, the very same feature, 
p(PvQ)≥p(P), can be an artifact in Alice’s credence function, but in Burt’s credences, it 
represents an actual features of Burt’s comparative beliefs.    On a political map, we can 
tell representational artifacts from features that genuinely represent some part of the 
represented object by referring to what type of feature it is.  Border lines and stars 
represent borders and capitals, but the particular colors of a country and the particular 
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location of the country’s name over the country are mere artifacts.  When it comes to 
credences that strongly (not fully) represent comparative beliefs, on the other hand, there 
is no way to know which features are actual features of the agent’s comparative beliefs 
and which are artifacts. 
The inaccuracy of credence functions that merely strongly represent will, for 
some agents, be extremely widespread.  It is possible that almost all of the comparative 
facts that fall out of an agent’s credences are mere artifacts.  Consider Cindy, who meets 
Non-triviality, Non-negativity, and Isovalence.  Cindy believes  and  for 
every proposition, and nothing else.  She meets Isovalence vacuously– there is no pair of 
sequences of propositions which contain the same number of truths at each possible 
world for which Cindy believes  for each pair.   
Strong representability, then, is not sufficient to ensure that credences can play the 
theoretical role the comparativist needs them to.  Credences, on the comparativist view, 
are supposed to be a useful fiction- a tool for representing comparative beliefs in a way 
that allows us to evaluate an agent epistemically.  However, strong representability, 
unlike full representability, allows for credence functions that are partially fabricated and 
offer no guide to sort the meaningful features from the mere artifacts.  Without full 
representability, then, it seems that the probability function picked out by the (strong) 
representation theorem won’t play the role that credences are meant to play according to 
comparativists.  The revised comparativist argument for probabilism, then, fails because 
Premise 3 is false.  A probability function that only strongly represents an agent’s 
comparative beliefs is such a poor representation that it could not be what the 




If we require full representability, then we must accept the implausible conclusion  
that any rational agent will satisfy Totality.  If we weaken the sort of representability we 
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require, then credence are a poor representation of comparative beliefs.  According to 
comparativism, we only have credences insofar as they represent our comparative beliefs 
well.  However, for agents with incomplete comparative beliefs, credence functions 
cannot represent comparative beliefs well.  
Where does this discussion leave comparativism? In order to establish 
comparativism as a genuine alternative to other approaches to credence, the comparativist 
aimed to show that 1) credence arises out of comparative belief and 2) that probabilism is 
true on a comparativist framework.   The comparativist shows (1) by articulating a 
theoretical role for credence–a tool for representing comparative belief– and arguing that 
if a probability function (or set of functions) plays that role sufficiently well, then it 
counts as an agent’s credence function.  However, rational agents need not have complete 
comparative beliefs (to say nothing of irrational agents).   Strong representability, which 
does not require Totality, is not enough to ground the claim that a probability function (or 
even an improbabilistic credence function for that matter) will represent an agent well 
enough to count as her credence function.   
 The comparativist establishes (2) with the comparativist argument for probabilism.  
I’ve presented two versions of this argument, one using full representability, the other 
using strong representability.  The first fails because it has as a premise the claim that a 
rational agent will satisfy Totality.  The second fails because its third premise –if an 
agent's comparative beliefs relation is strongly representable by some probability 
function p, then p is her credence function – is false. 
Where does this discussion leave comparativism? If the conclusions of this paper 
are correct, then there are two options worth discussing.  The first is to develop further 
notions of representability and representation theorems to go with them.  The hope would 
be to find a notion of representability strong enough to motivate the claim that a 
probability function is an agent’s credence function and a set of conditions on 
comparative beliefs that a rational agent would plausibly meet.  The second is to abandon 
probabilism and focus instead on the norms of comparative belief themselves.   
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Comparativism is the view that comparative beliefs, not credences, are 
psychologically real and primitive.    Comparativism is typically offered as an alternative 
view about what credences are, but strictly, it does not entail that any agents, even 
perfectly rational ones, be well representable by credences or subject to the requirements 
of probabilism.   Nothing I’ve said here, then, refutes comparativism. This points to one 
path forward for the comparativist: focus on the norms that govern comparative belief 
and abandon probabilism.   After all, if the norms on credences are derivative and these 
comparative belief norms are fundamental, there is no reason we could not simply 
theorize about them directly.   
Focusing on norms on comparative belief does not necessarily mean turning our 
back on the appeal of probabilism.  Each axiom of probability has a comparative belief 
analogue. Indeed, this was de Finetti’s aim in defining a qualitative probability, though 
his conditions do include Totality. The Non-Negativity axiom which says that , for 
all X, is the analogue of the axiom of the same name which says that p(X)≥0 for all X.   
The spirit of Normality could be captured by a principle that said , for all X.65  
Similarly, de Finetti offers a Qualitative Additivity axiom, an analogue of Quantitative 
Additivity: : If , then  if, and only if, . 
 Turning towards norms on comparative belief opens up questions that do not arise 
when we focus on norms on numerical credence.  While having complete comparative 
beliefs is not rationally required, and may even be rationally subpar, there does seem to 
be some comparative beliefs it’s irrational not to have.  Alice, for instance, ought to 
believe that PvQ is at least as likely as Q.  Even for some pairs of propositions that have 
no logical connection, it seems like that we ought to compare them.  For instance, I can 
see the rain outside my window and I know that it rarely rains in the Atacama desert.  It 
seems that I ought to think that it’s more likely that it’s raining outside my house than in 
the Atacama desert.  
 
65 De Finetti (1931)offers a different axiom called Normality:  :   X,  S.  The version I 
offer here is simply an example of a close analogue of the Normality condition on probability functions.  
 84 
 Comparativists look to representation theorems to show that comparativism can 
vindicate probabilism, despite considering norms on credence to be derivative.  However, 
comparativist argument for probabilism is not as foolproof as it looks.  If full 
representability is the standard, then the comparativist has to make the implausible claim 
that any rational agent has complete comparative beliefs.  On the other hand, if we settle 
for strong representability, credences turn out to be too comparative beliefs to play the 
role the comparativist wants them to.  This is not necessarily a death knell for 
comparativism.  It does, however, mean that comparativism is not a genuine alternative 
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